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TELL ME HOW IT ENDS:
THE PATH TO NATIONALIZING THE U.S.
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
By Fran Quigley*

ABSTRACT
The U.S. medicines system is broken. Millions of Americans suffer and some
even die because they cannot afford medicines discovered by government-funded
research. At the same time, corporations holding monopoly patent rights to those
medicines collect some of the largest profits in modern capitalist history.
It does not have to be this way. The global legacy of treating essential medicines
as a public good and the robust U.S. history of government seizure of private
property for the public interest reveals a better path: the United States should
nationalize its pharmaceutical industry.
U.S. statutory law already provides broad powers for the executive branch to
immediately order the substantial manufacturing and distribution of patent-free
medicines. That statutory authority should be immediately implemented and
further expanded. In addition, U.S. constitutional law justifies a full seizure of
all industry assets.
Given the pharmaceutical industry’s substantial reliance on government
funding and licensing, along with the industry’s widespread malfeasance that
harms the public welfare, the amount of compensation for this seizure will be
limited. That seizure and compensation will finally conclude the tragic era of
medicines profiteering and launch a new system that restores life-saving
medications to their rightful role as affordable, accessible public goods.

*
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law. The author also thanks the Type 1 diabetes patient activists with T1International, who
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INTRODUCTION
When they started, it was still light. Several dozen individuals
marched to a street corner just south of downtown Indianapolis,
where others were waiting for them. People kept arriving, some
carrying banners and signs, until the crowd spilled over the curb of
the broad sidewalk and into the street. A microphone was turned
on; some brief introductions were given. Then they began.
First, Janelle Lutgen spoke about her son Jesse. The only health
insurance Jesse could find had a $10,000 deductible, so he tried to
pay for his insulin out of pocket—and routinely came up short. He
died on February 7, 2018. Mindi Patterson talked about her sisterin-law, Meaghan, who also rationed the insulin she could not af-
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ford. Meaghan died of diabetic ketoacidosis on Christmas Eve in
2018. Antroinette Worsham found her twenty-two-year-old daughter Antavia lying in bed, not breathing. She had an empty vial of
insulin by her side.
Dusk began to fall. Candles were passed out and lit. Family
members kept coming forward, weeping, and carrying pictures of
their loved ones. All of those eulogized were Americans with Type
1 diabetes. Most were working, and some even had limited insurance. But none of them could afford the insulin manufactured by
corporations like Eli Lilly and Company, whose headquarters the
crowd had gathered in front of. After each family took their turn, a
local minister offered a prayer. “I stand in solidarity tonight with all
of the families who lost loved ones, not to a disease they carry, but
to a disease corporations carry. A disease called greed.”
Then Nicole Smith-Holt walked to the middle of the intersection, stopping directly in front of impressive fountains and colorful
signs with the Eli Lilly logo. Police cars surrounded her, and one
officer using a loudspeaker ordered her to leave the street. She ignored him and began reading the names of all the young Americans who had died from rationing insulin in the past two years.
Published accounts collected by the vigil organizer,
1
T1International, include at least a dozen such deaths. That is likely a significant undercount, as one in four Americans with Type 1
diabetes admit to rationing their insulin at least once in the past
2
year, each of them risking a fatal onset of diabetic ketoacidosis.
The police officer repeated his order. Smith-Holt spoke the
names a second time, this time prefacing each with the phrase
“Justice for . . . .” The crowd repeated the phrase and the names
back to her, their voices growing louder with each one. When it
was time for Smith-Holt to speak the name of her son Alec, who
died in 2017 at age twenty-six after rationing his insulin, her composure broke. She started sobbing. She took a deep breath, and
yelled, “Justice for Alec!” Smith-Holt was then arrested for blocking
3
traffic.

1. See
generally
T1INTERNATIONAL:
#INSULIN4ALL
USA,
https://www.
t1international.com/blog/category/usa-insulin4all (last visited May 28, 2020).
2. T1INTERNATIONAL, Costs and Rationing of Insulin and Diabetes Supplies: Findings from
the 2018 T1International Patient Survey 6 (2018), https://www.t1international.com/
media/assets/file/T1International_Report_-_Costs_and_Rationing_of_Insulin__Diabetes_
Supplies_2.pdf.
3. Mike Hoskins, Diabetes Advocate Forces Police Arrest at Insulin Vigil, HEALTHLINE
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.healthline.com/diabetesmine/diabetes-advocate-arrestinsulin-vigil#1; T1International, T1International #insulin4all Vigil 2019, YOUTUBE (Oct. 21,
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IECE592N1bU.
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Nearly one in three Americans say they have skipped medication
4
doses in the past year due to cost. Thirty-four million Americans
say they personally know someone who died from the inability to
5
pay for medicines or other care. Hospital emergency rooms across
the country regularly see patients in crisis because they could not
6
afford their asthma inhaler, blood pressure medicines, or insulin.
Globally, the United Nations estimates that nearly two billion people do not receive the medications they need, including children
who go without vaccines. Ten million of those people, approximately the population of New York City, die each year because
7
medicines are unaffordable to them.
This suffering stands in contrast to the robust health of the forprofit pharmaceutical industry. Although most medicines are
manufactured at costs of just pennies per dose, corporations hold
government-granted patent monopolies on many of them, enabling prices to be set at levels that are hundreds and even thou8
sands of times higher than their cost. U.S. drug prices are the
highest in the world and are raised annually at a rate far beyond
9
overall inflation. As a result, the pharmaceutical industry is one of
the most profitable sectors in modern times, with annual corporate
10
profit margins reaching as high as forty percent.
Consider the case of insulin, the medicine that Alec RaeshawnSmith and the other young Americans eulogized on that Indianapolis street corner could not afford. A vial of insulin that cost
pharmaceutical corporations only about $6 to manufacture has in4. Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll – February 2019: Prescription Drugs,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 11, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kffhealth-tracking-poll-february-2019-prescription-drugs.
5. Dan Witters, Millions in U.S. Lost Someone Who Couldn’t Afford Treatment, GALLUP
(Nov. 12, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/268094/millions-lost-someone-couldnafford-treatment.aspx.
6. See Kohei Hasegawa et al., Emergency Department Visits for Acute Asthma by Adults Who
Ran Out of Their Inhaled Medications, 35 ALLERGY & ASTHMA PROC. e42, e49 (2014).
7. Paul Hunt (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health), Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights: Human Rights Questions, Including Alternative Approaches for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. A/63/263 at 15 (Aug. 11,
2008), http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/human_rights/A63_263.pdf.
8. See Andrew Hill et al., Minimum Costs for Producing Hepatitis C Direct-Acting Antivirals
for Use in Large-Scale Treatment Access Programs in Developing Countries, 58 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 928, 928–36 (2014); Dzintars Gotham et al., Production Costs and Potential Prices for
Biosimilars of Human Insulin and Insulin Analogues, BRIT. MED. J. GLOBAL HEALTH, Sept. 25,
2018, at 1, 3, https://gh.bmj.com/content/3/5/e000850.full.pdf.
9. Dena Bunis, Prescription Drug Prices Increase by Double the Rate of Inflation, AARP
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info-2019/prescriptiondrug-price-report.html; STAFF OF H. WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 116TH CONG., A PAINFUL PILL
TO SWALLOW: U.S. VS. INTERNATIONAL PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 6 (2019), https://waysand
means.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/U.S.%20vs.
%20International%20Prescription%20Drug%20Prices_0.pdf.
10. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC NEWS (Nov.
6, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223.
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creased in price more than one thousand percent in recent years.
11
That single vial is now priced as high as $300. Most Americans
with Type 1 diabetes face medicine and supplies costs of $1300 a
12
month or more. The three corporations that dominate the global
insulin market report annual profits that are double the average of
13
other Fortune 500 companies.
The crowd gathered in front of the Eli Lilly and Company headquarters reflected the mood of the U.S. public: Americans are furious. Multiple polls show U.S. respondents identifying medicine
14
costs as the top issue Congress should tackle. Americans are increasingly aware of their government’s role in funding the discovery of drugs, granting monopoly patents on those discoveries to
private companies, and then paying, through Medicare and other
government programs, the monopoly mark-up price for the medicines produced. “Taxpayers paying twice” has become a refrain re15
peated by politicians and advocates.
The same polls show that Americans are ready for a bold response to the crisis. Eighty-four percent support breaking patent
16
monopolies to allow for production of lower-cost medicines. Twothirds support making prescription drugs public goods paid for by
17
the federal government. The U.S. public’s demands are not outlandish. They are fully in line with the global legacy of treating
prescription medicines as a public good and with U.S. law and history justifying swift nationalization of private industry in a time of
crisis. The United States can nationalize its pharmaceutical industry, and it should.

11. Ed Silverman, Insulin Prices Could Be Much Lower and Drug Makers Would Still Make
Healthy Profits, STAT (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2018/09/25
/insulin-prices-profits-diabetes.
12. Cf. Peter Callaghan, How the Death of Alec Smith Pushed Minnesota Lawmakers to Address
The Rising Cost of Insulin, MINNPOST (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.minnpost.com/stategovernment/2019/01/how-the-death-of-alec-smith-pushed-minnesota-lawmakers-to-addressthe-rising-cost-of-insulin.
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS, RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS (2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688472.pdf.
14. Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll - September 2019: Health Care Policy in
Congress and on the Campaign Trail, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-september-2019.
15. Robert Pear, ‘Paying Twice’: A Push for Affordable Prices for Taxpayer-Funded Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/us/politics/drug-prices
.html.
16. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: THE VOTER SPEAKS
2 (2019), https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/AV-Summary-of-PollingProject_052119_FINAL.pdf.
17. LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS & ASO COMMC’NS, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR PRESCRIPTION
DRUG PRICE REFORM: FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY OF 1,503 AMERICAN ADULTS 3 (2016).
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I. THE FALLACY OF MEDICINE PATENTS INCENTIVIZING INNOVATION
The pharmaceutical industry’s justification for retaining the current system and rejecting a public pharmaceutical model is that patent monopolies and the inflated prices they enable are necessary
18
to spur life-saving innovation in medicines research. There is a
fundamental flaw in that argument. The true innovators in medicines discovery are not the holders of those monopolies, but rather
the entities that award them: governments.
Governments are far and away the dominant funder of the basic
science research that makes up the earliest stage of the medicines
development process, the riskiest and most lengthy component of
19
medicines discovery. The U.S. National Institutes of Health
(NIH) has an annual budget of $40 billion that is largely devoted
to funding the early-stage research that creates the building blocks
20
for follow-on development of medicines. Virtually every significant pharmaceutical breakthrough of the past half-century has
government provenance, and each of the 210 new drugs approved
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration from 2010 to 2016 trac21
es its roots back to government-funded research. Of course, the
critical role played by government funding is not limited to the
medicines field. The internet, the discovery of the chemical structure of DNA, and breakthroughs in nuclear energy were all based
22
on publicly funded research.
Until the 1980s, U.S.-financed research breakthroughs were either owned by the federal agency that funded them or placed in
23
the public domain. But today, those discoveries end up in private,
for-profit hands complete with long-term patent monopolies. The

18. See, e.g., PHRMA, IMPLICATIONS OF SPEAKER PELOSI’S DRUG PRICING PLAN 10 (2019),
https://www.phrma.org/-/media/Project/PhRMA/PhRMA-Org/PhRMA-Org/PDF/MediaBriefing-Slides-on-HR-3_101019-FINAL.pdf.
19. See MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS.
PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 73–77 (2015).
20. See Budget, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/
budget (last reviewed May 20, 2020).
21. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The Roles of Academia, Rare Diseases, and Repurposing in the Development of the Most Transformative Drugs, 34 HEALTH AFF. 286, 286
(2015); Bhaven N. Sampat & Frank R. Lichtenberg, What Are the Respective Roles of the Public
and Private Sectors in Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 332, 334
(2011), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0917; History of Medicine
Timeline,
DATESANDEVENTS.ORG,
http://www.datesandevents.org/events-timelines/10history-of-medicine-timeline.htm (last visited June 27, 2020); A Question of Utility, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2015, at 50–52.
22. Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? Political Organising Behind TRIPS, THE CORNER HOUSE (Sept. 30, 2004), at 26, http://www.thecorner
house.org.uk/resource/who-owns-knowledge-economy.
23. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost, 43
HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2007).
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change came about with the 1980 passage of the Patent and
Trademark Law Amendments Act, more commonly known as the
24
Bayh-Dole Act. Pushed by the pharmaceutical industry, Congress
decided to allow universities and corporations that receive federal
research funding to claim patents for the discoveries that come out
of that research. The result is that private companies benefit from
a process that socializes the risks of medicines research and privatizes its rewards. As economist Marianna Mazzucato says, the United
States “invests in the most uncertain stage of the business cycle and
25
lets businesses hop on for the easier ride down the way.”
Government support for the pharmaceutical development process does not end at the early research stage. In addition to their
patent rights, pharmaceutical corporations are often eligible for
tax credits as high as fifty percent to support their follow-on re26
search. In addition, the government provides corporations with
27
tax deductions for the cost of clinical trials. And one in four medicines benefit from direct government support for that late-stage
28
research as well.

24. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012).
25. MAZZUCATO, supra note 19, at 1. The COVID-19 pandemic provides an example of
this phenomenon. Before the pandemic outbreak in 2020, the NIH had already invested
almost $700 million into the coronavirus research that is the foundation for the vaccine and
therapeutics research being conducted. Government Funds Coronavirus Research While
Pharma Sits By, PUB. CITIZEN (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.citizen.org/news
/government-funds-coronavirus-research-while-pharma-sits-by. In March 2020, Congress allocated $3 billion more for this research. Lauren Hirsch & Kevin Breuniger, Trump Signs
$8.3 Billion Emergency Coronavirus Spending Package, CNBC (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/06/trump-signs-8point3-billion-emergency-coronavirusspending-package.html. Patient activists worried that the current pharmaceutical development model meant that even this enormous public investment would not ensure that the
resulting treatments would be affordable. “Once government funded research identifies a
vaccine or treatment, under current policy, a drug corporation will bring the product to
market at any price—and without regard to the taxpayer’s integral role in its discovery.” David Mitchell, COVID-19 Treatments Won’t Work if We Can’t Afford Them, PATIENTS FOR
AFFORDABLE DRUGS (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.patientsforaffordabledrugs.org/2020/
03/26/covid-19.
26. See Zachary Brennan, Senate, House Agree to Cut Orphan Drug Research Credit in Half in
Tax Bill, RAPS: REG. FOCUS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%E2%84
%A2/news-articles/2017/12/senate,-house-agree-to-cut-orphan-drug-research-credit-in-halfin-tax-bill.
27. See Thomas Moore et al., Estimated Costs of Pivotal Trials for Novel Therapeutic Agents
Approved by the US Food and Drug Administration, 2015-2016, JAMA INTERNAL MED. (Sept. 24,
2018) (finding that clinical trials that support FDA approvals of new drugs have a median
cost of $19 million, far lower than the industry’s claims for the costs of trials).
28. Rahul K. Nayak et al., Public Sector Financial Support for Late Stage Discovery of New
Drugs in the United States: Cohort Study, BRIT. MED. J. (2019), https://www.bmj.com/content/
367/bmj.l5766; see generally James B. Krellenstein, Taxpayer Funded Development of Truvada as
PrEP, THE PREP4ALL COLLABORATION (May, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (providing an example of publiclyfunded clinical trials).
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Predictably, private research dollars focus more on profitseeking than public health. Of the drugs receiving FDA approval
from 2005 to 2016, only thirteen percent addressed an unmet
medical need or helped advance patient care. The rest were socalled “me too” drugs, providing little to no therapeutic benefit
29
over products already available to consumers. The intent is to
carve out a share of an existing lucrative market, which is understandable from a corporate standpoint but wasteful from a public
benefit perspective. Just as predictably, for-profit research concentrates on the development of medicines that can be sold at a high
30
mark-up to wealthy consumers. The current system provides no
incentive for research that addresses the needs of the global poor.
Of the 1,556 new chemical entities marketed between 1975 and
2004, only twenty-one were for tropical, sometimes known as “neglected,” diseases that primarily impact persons in developing
31
countries.
When direct government support and tax subsidies are all accounted for, some analysts estimate that private corporations pay
32
for only one third of U.S. biomedical research. And the research
that is sponsored by private corporations is often tainted by inappropriate methodology and selective reporting of findings, including the suppression of negative results, motivated by the drive for

29.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY: PROFITS, RESEARCH
DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUISITION DEALS 41–42 (2017),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688472.pdf; Victoria Costello, Talking about Drug Prices &
Access to Medicines Pt 1: By Els Torreele, Open Society Foundations, PLOS BLOGS (Oct. 13, 2015),
https://blogs.plos.org/yoursay/2015/10/13/talking-about-drug-prices-access-to-medicines.
30. Importantly, even the later stage development of patented medicines is rarely conducted by the companies that hold their rights: a recent report showed that eighty-one percent of two leading corporations’ products listed in 2017 were developed elsewhere, at
which time the large corporations—using resources earned from other drugs’ patentinflated pricing—purchased their rights. Emily H. Jung et al., Do Large Pharma
Companies Provide Drug Development Innovation? Our Analysis Says No, STAT (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/12/10/large-pharma-companies-provide-little-new-drugdevelopment-innovation.
31. Pierre Chirac & Els Torrele, Global Framework on Essential Health R&D, 367 LANCET
1560, 1560 (May 13, 2006), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736(06)68672-8/fulltext. One of the casualties of this model is the lack of financial incentive for for-profit pharmaceutical corporations to develop vaccines, antibiotics, and other
responses to infectious diseases, in part because the widespread need for—and purchase
of—such treatments is not assured, and in part because the affected population may be too
poor to afford high treatment costs. In the case of both Ebola and COVID-19, this dynamic
slowed development of promising treatments before the outbreaks occurred. Julia Belluz,
Umair Ifan & Brian Resnick, A Guide to the Vaccines and Drugs That Could Fight Coronavirus,
VOX (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2020/3/4/21154590/
coronavirus-vaccine-treatment-covid-19-drug-cure.
32. Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 15,
15–16 (2013), https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/jep.27.1.3.
AND

SUMMER 2020]

Tell Me How It Ends

763

33

profits instead of public health concerns. Economist Dean Baker
has calculated that if lawmakers withdrew the patent monopolies
that support massive price mark-ups for medicines, the resulting
savings would allow every dollar of privately funded medicines research and development to be more than matched by increased
government investment. That investment could be focused on pub34
lic health rather than profit-seeking.
It is worth noting that the fallacy of patent-motivated innovation
is not limited to the medicines field. Patents are artificiallyimposed zones of exclusivity acting as an “anti-commons” by blocking the follow-on use of information that could lead to further in35
novation. As a result, multiple studies have shown monopolies are
not only ineffective at incentivizing innovation, but they are also a
36
barrier to follow-on discoveries. By contrast, most of history’s
37
great innovations have occurred outside the patent system. Analyses of the effects of compulsory licensing, where a government
overrides a patent and allows generic production, show that these
38
patent bypasses open up the field and encourage innovation.
One of the anti-innovation effects of patents is to incentivize the
creation of barriers to discovery, such as the voluminous patent
“thickets” created by pharmaceutical corporations in the pursuit of
extended monopolies. A 2018 report by Initiative for Medicines,
Access and Knowledge (I-MAK) revealed that the twelve top-selling
drugs in the United States average a remarkable 125 patent appli39
cations per drug, many of them frivolous. The effect of this thicketing is that each drug carries an average of thirty-eight years of attempted patent protections—far beyond the baseline twenty-year

33. Adam Gaffney and Joel Lexchin, Healing an Ailing Pharmaceutical System: Prescription
for Reform for United States and Canada, BRIT. MED. J., May 17, 2018, at 2, 9,
12, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k1039. Gaffney and Lexchin also point to concerns that
the U.S. drug review and approval process has been corrupted by the Food and Drug Administration’s fiscal reliance on fees paid by pharmaceutical companies. Id. at 11.
34. DEAN BAKER, RIGGED: HOW GLOBALIZATION AND THE RULES OF THE MODERN
ECONOMY WERE STRUCTURED TO MAKE THE RICH RICHER 106–16 (2006).
35. Micheal A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. MAG. 698, 698–701 (1998), https://science
.sciencemag.org/content/280/5364/698.
36. DEAN BAKER ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, INNOVATION,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND DEVELOPMENT: A BETTER SET OF APPROACHES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 10 (2017), http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/baker-jayadev-stiglitzinnovation-ip-development-2017-07.pdf.
37. Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation in Economic History 9–11, 16–17 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21964, 2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2712428.
38. Id.
39. I-MAK, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: HOW EXCESSIVE PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING
IS EXTENDING MONOPOLIES AND DRIVING UP DRUG PRICES (2018), http://www.i-mak.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/I-MAK-Overpatented-Overpriced-Report.pdf.
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40

patent life. For example, Sanofi, which sells Lantus, a long-acting
insulin relied upon by persons with Type 1 diabetes, has taken out
41
seventy-four patents on the drug. Sixty-nine of those patents were
obtained not during the development process, but after the insulin
42
was already on the market. This protectionism clashes with the
well-established benefits of open access practices like creative
commons licenses, open access journals, and especially the opensource-software movement that has contributed to transformative
innovations in the fields of healthcare, education, and communica43
tion.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. is a powerful example of the positive effects on innovation when patent barriers are removed. 44 The
Court’s ruling, that naturally-occurring genes could not be patented, enabled research on a previously patent-protected gene that
increases the probability of breast cancer. The new research quickly led to more accurate testing for the gene at lower prices. 45 Association for Molecular Pathology was part of a comprehensive 2017
review of the current medicines patenting system by economists
Dean Baker, Arjun Jayadev, and Joseph Stiglitz. They concluded
that the system should be radically revised, if not completely abandoned:
Intellectual Property Rights are not an end in themselves
but only a means towards greater economic welfare for all.
We tolerate and sanction known economic inefficiencies
such as those that arise from the private monopolies that
are created and sustained through the IPR regime as a

40. Id. at 2.
41. I-MAK, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: LANTUS SPECIAL EDITION (2018), http://www.
i-mak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/I-MAK-Lantus-Report-2018-10-30F.pdf.
42. Id. at 4.
43. See Aseem Sharma, The Impact of Open Source on Business and Social Good,
OPENSOURCE.COM (Feb. 4, 2013), https://opensource.com/business/13/1/impact-opensource-business; cf. JÜRGEN BITZER & P. J. H. SCHRÖDER, The Impact of Entry and Competition by
Open Source Software on Innovation Activity, in THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE
DEVELOPMENT 219, 242–44 (2013).
44. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
45. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 36, at 14 (citing Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 569 U.S.
576). In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers made public calls for open sharing of data to speed discovery of treatments and vaccines and to ensure the safety and efficacy of new discoveries that will come from the flurry of research activity. E. Richard Gold, The
Coronavirus Pandemic Has Shattered the Status Quo on Drug Development. We Should Build on That, FORTUNE
(Mar. 26, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/03/26/coronavirus-vaccine-drug-developmentopen-science-covid-19-treatment; Christopher J. Morten et al., To Help Develop the Safest, Most
Effective Coronavirus Tests, Treatments, and Vaccines, Ensure Public Access to Clinical Research Data,
HEALTH AFF. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200326
.869114/full.
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gamble in this regard. Our contention is that this gamble
46
has not paid adequate dividends.

II. MEDICINES AS A PUBLIC GOOD
Fortunately, an alternative to the patent system exists. Instead of
treating life-essential medicines as for-profit commodities ripe for
monopolizing and price-gouging, they should be treated as public
goods available to all. Considering medicines as public goods is
consistent with both economic theory and the multi-century, global
legacy of preventing private entities from monopolizing and pricegouging drugs that are essential for life and health.
Economists define public goods as being non-rivalrous, meaning
any person can benefit from the good without reducing the opportunity of others to benefit. Public goods are also non-excludable,
meaning a person cannot be prevented from consuming the good
47
in question. The classic example of a non-rivalrous, nonexcludable public good is a lighthouse. One ship benefitting from
its warning does not prevent any other ship from enjoying the
same benefit, and the lighthouse’s warnings are open to all. Collectively, U.S. society has determined that no one should die because
they cannot afford privately-set prices for fire and disaster response, police protection, or safety inspections for food and water.
Government action has instead placed services like law enforcement, fire response, and public health protections, along with tangible goods like infrastructure and parks in the category of public
goods.
Essential medicines should be on that list. Medicines fit the definition of a public good; although an individual pill is available to
only one person, the formula for creating it can be widely shared.
Overall, knowledge is a classic public good because its distribution
demands no sacrifice from its original owner. Medicines possess
48
another core quality of public goods: positive externalities. One
person’s consumption of an essential medicine provides clear soci-

46. BAKER ET AL., supra note 36, at 70.
47. Fran Quigley, Corporations Killed Medicine. Here’s How to Take It Back, THE NATION
(Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/corporations-killed-medicine-hereshow-to-take-it-back; see also Brook Baker & Tenu Avafia, The Evolution of IPRs from Humble Beginnings to the Modern Day TRIPS-plus Era: Implications for Treatment Access (Tech. Advisory
Grp. of the Glob. Comm’n on HIV & the Law, Working Paper, 2011),
http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/working-papers?task=document.viewdoc&id=
101.
48. Quigley, supra note 47.
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etal benefits beyond the direct consumer. For example, vaccines
halt the spread of disease and effective treatment leads to greater
productivity.
So, it is no surprise that human societies have been treating
medicines as a public good for centuries. The notion of intellectual property only began to achieve broad acceptance in the last 150
years. But even as nations signed on to the 1883 Paris Convention,
the 1886 Berne Convention, and the United Nations’ World Intellectual Property Organization in 1967, many deliberately chose to
49
exclude medicines from the items eligible for patent protection.
For example, Germany’s patent law of 1877 labeled medicines,
along with food and chemicals, as “essential goods” and prohibited
50
any attempts to patent them. During the mid-20th century, India,
Brazil, Mexico, and several other Central and South American
countries adopted explicit limits on the patentability of medi51
cines.
European countries like Italy and Sweden did not grant pharmaceutical patents until the 1970s, and Spain refused to do so until
52
1992. Even in nations that allowed medicine patents, liberal ac53
cess to compulsory licenses for patented drugs was common.
Compulsory licenses bypass patents by allowing the government to
either directly manufacture the patented invention or to license
another entity to manufacture it, with a royalty paid to the patentholder. In the mid-20th century, Canada issued hundreds of licenses to import or manufacture pharmaceutical products. During
the same period, even the United States issued dozens of compul54
sory licenses for medicines. The law reflected the culture. When
asked why he sold his patent for insulin for just $1 in 1923, Nobel
laureate Frederick Banting said that “insulin does not belong to
55
me; it belongs to the world.” When Jonas Salk was asked in 1952
why he did not seek a patent on the polio vaccine, he replied,
56
“could you patent the sun?”
But, in the late 20th century, the pharmaceutical industry
launched a concerted attack on this centuries-long tradition. Leveraging its lobbying and political power in the United States, where
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Baker & Avafia, supra note 47, at 4–5.
54. See Hannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18 YALE J. LAW & TECH 275, 305–06 (2016).
55. Sir
Fredrick
Banting,
MD,
CANADIAN
MEDICAL
HALL
OF
FAME,
http://www.cdnmedhall.org/inductees/frederickbanting (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
56. GLOBAL CITIZEN, Could You Patent the Sun?, YOUTUBE (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=erHXKP386Nk.
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much of the industry is located, corporations convinced successive
presidential administrations to prioritize intellectual property protection in all trade negotiations. Nations that did not provide “adequate and effective” protection for U.S. patents, a term created by
the pharmaceutical industry-supported 1984 U.S. Trade Act, faced
57
severe sanctions. Soon after the law was passed, the United States
placed India and Brazil, two countries that resisted medicine patents most vigorously, on its “priority” watch list, a precursor to
58
trade sanctions.
At the same time, the World Trade Organization in 1986 convened talks to create a global intellectual property pact, which
eventually became the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). When the negotiations began, nearly half of the countries involved blocked patents for medicines and most of the rest had established strict limits on their use. But the United States aggressively pressured its
trade partners, many of whom relied heavily on the economic value of the trading relationship, to change their approach. The result: by 1994, one hundred and twenty-three countries signed on to
TRIPS, which established a twenty-year global baseline for patent
59
protections for inventions, including medicines.
Yet the longtime character of medicines as public goods was not
fully extinguished. The TRIPS Agreement protects national rights
to bypass patents by way of compulsory licenses or importation of
60
medicines, especially when public health is at stake. And the postTRIPS medicines system continues to be the antithesis of a laissezfaire market model, given the massive government subsidies for research, bulk government purchases of medicines, and widespread,
if not comprehensive, government provision of medicines to their
61
citizens at low or no cost.
As Dana Brown chronicled in her discussion of the extensive
benefits to be gained from public ownership of the pharmaceutical
process, Sweden, Brazil, Cuba, Thailand, China, and other nations
embrace public ownership of key components of their medicines

57. 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2012); see Sean Flynn, What is Special 301? A Historical Primer,
INFOJUSTICE (May 1, 2013), http://infojustice.org/archives/29465.
58. Flynn, supra note 57; Quigley, supra note 47.
59. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 33 (1994),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm
[hereinafter
TRIPS
Agreement].
60. Id. at art. 31.
61. See Alfred B. Engelberg, How Government Policy Promotes High Drug Prices, HEALTH
AFF. (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20151029.051488/
full.
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62

system. Much of this enduring character of medicines as public
goods reflects popular demand. U.S.-focused activism in the 1980s
and 1990s led to groundbreaking government-funded discoveries
in HIV/AIDS treatment. And global activism in the early 2000s led
to governments bypassing patents on those discoveries and directly
63
providing treatment to millions at zero cost.
The public good roots of medicines are alive, and they can be
nurtured as an alternative to the current system that is weighed
down by private interests and monopoly distortions. The savings
gained from removing the massive patent-created profits from the
system can fund alternative mechanisms for innovation, including
expanded publicly-funded research, like the enormously successful
programs of the NIH, increased tax credits or deductions that subsidize private research as it occurs, prize funds to reward groundbreaking innovations with cash instead of monopoly rights, and
64
other non-profit approaches.
The legacy of the NIH, along with that of the National Science
Foundation and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(creator of the internet), prove the effectiveness of publicly funded
approaches to innovation. So too does the non-profit, governmentsupported track record of organizations devoted to drug development. For example, the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative has
led over forty research and development projects and delivered
eight highly impactful treatments, with twenty new chemical entities in its pipeline. 65 And the Mario Negri Institute’s researchers
62. DANA BROWN, DEMOCRACY COLLABORATIVE, MEDICINE FOR ALL: THE CASE FOR A
PUBLIC OPTION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, Sept. 2019, https://thenextsystem.org/
sites/default/files/2019-09/MedicineforAll_WEB.pdf; Linda McQuaig, That Time Canada
Had A Public Lab that Made Life-Saving Drugs, THE TYEE (Nov. 8, 2019), https://thetyee.ca/
Analysis/2019/11/08/Canada-Public-Lab-Life-Saving-Drugs/?utm_source=national&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=141119. Brown discusses the pharmaceutical nationalization process in Sweden (existing private corporations transformed into state-owned companies, which was later split into two state-owned companies) and Cuba (existing companies
consolidated under the Ministry of Health). BROWN, supra, at 35–36, 57–58. Those examples, and the more advanced discussion of the fate of insurance companies under a singlepayer Medicare for All–type transformation, can inform the pharmaceutical transformation
process in the United States. For example, there are proposals for absorbing some private
insurance employees into a government-run system while retraining or offering early retirement to others. See Robert Pollin et al., Economic Analysis of Medicare for All, PERI U. MASS.
108–19 (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1127-economicanalysis-of-medicare-for-all. Similarly, a nationalized pharmaceutical system would likely retain—or even expand—the private research-focused workforce but would need to retrain or
transition most sales and marketing personnel.
63. See generally, RAYMOND A. SMITH & PATRICIA D. SIPLON, DRUGS INTO BODIES: GLOBAL
AIDS TREATMENT ACTIVISM (2006).
64. Fran Quigley, Making Medicines Accessible: Alternatives to the Flawed Patent System,
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.hhrjournal.org/2015/11/makingmedicines-accessible-alternatives-to-the-flawed-patent-system-2.
65. Fran Quigley, Escaping Big Pharma’s Pricing with Patent-Free Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (July 28,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/opinion/escaping-big-pharmas-pricing-with-
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have published over 12,000 oft-cited articles in scientific journals,
and average eighty clinical trials being conducted at any one time,
with over 70,000 patients enrolled. 66
All of these entities offer demonstrated advantages over the current model: they prioritize public health over drugs’ potential profitability, they avoid the well-chronicled ethical problems associated
with research fueled by the profit motive, they allow the fruits of
research to be available for follow-on discoveries, and they can distribute medicines at dramatically lower prices as compared to pri67
vate companies.
III. THE UNITED STATES’ HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT SEIZURES SUPPORT NATIONALIZING
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
The United States is often characterized as a society with unshakeable reverence for private property rights and a reluctance to
sanction the government seizing private property for collective use.
Yet the historical record tells a different story. Local and state governments have widely and continually used eminent domain rights,
and the United States has a lengthy track record of nationalizing
private companies and entire industries and local and state governments. Nationalizing the pharmaceutical industry would be
consistent with a multi-century legacy of elevating the public good
over private property rights.

A. The U.S. Reverence for Private Property: Mythology vs. Reality
The cultural and political ties between the United States and
private property date back to the original European settlers in the
territory, many of whom fled feudalist systems in the hopes of
68
claiming and owning their own land. From the very beginning,

patent-free-drugs.html; DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, https://www.dndi.org/
about-dndi (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
66. Fran Quigley, Want Good Pharma? Here is One Example of What it May Look Like,
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://sites.sph.harvard.edu/hhrjournal/2016/12/
want-good-pharma-one-example-of-what-that-may-look-like.
67. Fran Quigley, Remove the For-Profit Variable from Clinical Drug Trials, HEALTH & HUM.
RTS. J. (May 21, 2017), https://www.hhrjournal.org/2017/05/remove-the-for-profit-variablefrom-clinical-drug-trials-2.
68. LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND POLICIES 54 (Gregory
K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong, eds. 2009), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/
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the image of a self-reliant, agrarian colonial American freeholder
took on powerful political symbolism. Thomas Jefferson was one of
many of the nation’s founders who equated private property rights
(for white males) with democracy. John Adams often sparred with
Jefferson, but on this point they agreed. “Property must be secured
or liberty cannot exist,” Adams wrote. “The moment the idea is
admitted into society that property is not as sacred as the laws of
God, and that there is not a force of law and public justice to pro69
tect it, anarchy and tyranny commence.”
Those are ringing words, but they only carried so far. Even in
Adams’ era, local governments were exercising eminent domain
over private property, and cities barred some businesses from locating within their boundaries. The American Revolution set the stage
for widespread seizures of British-held property, including redistri70
bution of two-thirds of New York City and its suburbs. Although
Jefferson and Adams concurred on the preeminence of private
property, their view was not uniform among their fellow founders.
Benjamin Franklin said, “private property is a creature of society,
and is subject to the calls of the society whenever its necessities re71
quire it, even to the last farthing.” There is evidence that Jefferson’s original vision for the Declaration of Independence echoed
John Locke’s call for protection of “life, liberty, and property,” but
the reference to property was replaced with “pursuit of happiness”
72
by the drafting committee, which included Franklin.
Thirteen years later, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution balanced those competing interests, sanctioning in its Takings
Clause both public appropriation of private property and the right
of those property holders to be reimbursed: “Nor shall private
73
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” As
the industrial revolution and the urbanization of the country led to
more regulation and seizures of private property, generations of
Supreme Court justices were left to interpret the Amendment’s
reference to both private property and just compensation. The
Court’s conclusions usually ran counter to the cultural notion of
the United States as a private property-focused nation.
files/pubfiles/2077_1400_LP2008-ch03-U.S.-Private-Property-Rights-in-InternationalPerspective_0.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Gerald Friedman, The Sanctity of Property Rights in American History 5 (Political Econ.
Research Inst., Working Paper No. 14, 2001), https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1008&context=peri_workingpapers.
71. Carol V. Hamilton, Why Did Jefferson Change “Property” to the “Pursuit of Happiness”?,
HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 27, 2008), https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/46460;
LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y, supra note 68, at 55.
72. Id.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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In a recent example, in the 2005 case Kelo v. City of New London,
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the city’s Fifth Amendment right
to seize private property, even if the “public use” was to redistribute
the property to other private entities in the name of economic de74
velopment. The decision triggered a public backlash in support
of private property rights, including dozens of state legislative efforts to prohibit government takings for mere economic development purposes or private gain. Many takings limits were adopted in
state legislation or construed by state courts to exist in state consti75
tutions.
It should be noted that the post-Kelo debate and the subsequent
state law limitations would not impact the seizure of pharmaceutical industry assets envisioned here. That debate aims at the outer
boundaries of the Court’s interpretation of public use and public
purpose, while the seizures called for here are squarely in the multi-century tradition of takings for public use. These takings will not
be conducted for broad non-governmental economic development
purposes and they will not result in gain for other private interests,
the characteristics that triggered the backlash against the Kelo decision.
Land policy and property rights historian Harvey Jacobs concluded that the rhetorical bark of property rights advocates in recent decades has proved to be more formidable than their bite.
“They had been ineffective in changing the fundamental way government at the national, state, and local levels acted toward and
76
upon property.” Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has never rejected a government seizure on the grounds that the taking was
77
not for “public use.”
Beyond court decisions, the U.S. cultural and political posture
venerating private property has long been at odds with the comparatively quiet but widespread embrace of public ownership and
operation of property, goods, and services. The list of publicly
owned entities at the core of U.S. societies is well-known and substantial enough to deserve noting: public safety (police, fire departments, courts, and prisons), infrastructure (streets, sewers, and
public utilities that are often the providers of water and electricity),
schools from pre-kindergarten to post-graduate levels, the postal

74. 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005). In 1897, the Supreme Court incorporated the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause, making it applicable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
75. See Eminent Domain, INST. JUST., https://ij.org/issues/private-property/eminentdomain (last visited Dec. 26, 2019).
76. LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y, supra note 68, at 60.
77. R. George Wright, Fundamental Property Rights, 21 VAL. L. REV. 75, 95 n.93 (1986).
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service, public transportation, and much of the healthcare system
from local clinics and community hospitals to the nationwide Vet78
erans Administration system. A full sixteen percent of the federal
79
budget is spent on security and defense costs. Although much of
that funding goes to private contractors, the government typically
retains intellectual property rights on what is invented and manu80
factured, in contrast to the medicines model. Recognizing the
success of that approach and its ready applicability to the goal of
developing new medicines, some economists have called for a
81
“NASA for Prescription Drugs.”
One-third of the nation’s real estate is public land—from the
neighborhood dog run to airports, commercial ports, and the fiftytwo million acres of national parks. Some of that public land makes
up the interstate highway system, a product of the largest public
works program in U.S. history. Like many other government projects, it was made possible by aggressive exercise of eminent domain, which is both the most enduring refutation of the preeminence of private property rights in the United States and the most
widespread use of the government powers secured by the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause.
Across the country, governments at all levels routinely use their
eminent domain power to seize privately held land to further public safety, protect the environment, and build or expand roads,
railways, government buildings, and parks. The Fifth Amendment
usually mandates compensation be paid for these seizures, but the
82
government authority to conduct them is unquestioned. As the
U.S. Supreme Court said in Boom Co. v. Patterson in 1879, the government right to seize private property “requires no constitutional

78. Admittedly, the list of publicly owned institutions is even larger in many European
and Asian countries, where rail lines, airlines, banks, internet services and energy companies
are routinely publicly owned. GAR ALPEROVITZ, WHAT THEN MUST WE DO?: STRAIGHT TALK
ABOUT THE NEXT AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95 (2013).
79. Policy Basics: Where Do Our Federal Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
(Jan 29, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-budget/policy-basics-where-do-ourfederal-tax-dollars-go.
80. See Fran Quigley, Building a NASA for Prescription Drugs, THE NEW REPUBLIC, (May
2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148361/building-nasa-prescription-drugs.
81. Id.
82. Some scholars have argued that there is no economic justification for government
compensation for private losses due to takings. Since losses due to other causes, such as fire
or natural disaster, are protected against by private insurance, the argument goes, that insurance should be the source of protection against takings losses, not government compensation. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 534–35
(1986); see generally Laurence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 572 (1984) (arguing that without private insurance
providing this type of coverage, it “may be appropriate for government to provide such insurance in the form of compensation”).
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recognition; it is an attribute of sovereignty.” The practical justification for eminent domain reflects the untenable position a government would inhabit if a private land owner refused to sell, or
set an exorbitant price for, land needed to build roads, establish
waterways, place utilities, etc. for the benefit of the public.
The broad disbursement of authority among government entities to exercise eminent domain means that there is no centralized
84
data available on how often it is exercised. But historic examples
reveal its significant scope, beginning with the 19th century Supreme Court cases affirming the federal government’s right to
seize private land to build a Cincinnati post office (Kohl v. United
States) and a battlefield memorial (United States v. Gettysburg Electric
85
Railroad Co.). During the New Deal era of the 1930s, the government vigorously asserted its eminent domain powers to establish
national parks and to enable public works programs. 86
World War II saw the acquisition of twenty million acres of private property for airports, proving grounds, military storage, and
other defense uses. The Assistant Attorney General of the United
States called the Lands Division of the Department of Justice, “the
87
biggest real estate office of any time or any place.” After the war,
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, signed into law and enthusiastically implemented by Republican President Dwight Eisenhower, set the stage for the United States and other governments to
exercise eminent domain in more than a half-million instances as
88
they constructed the interstate highway system.
This lengthy and ongoing legacy of government assertion of
ownership of private property creates a substantial precedent for
nationalizing the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. While the eminent
domain examples in particular pertain to real property, Part V will
show that government use of privately held intellectual property is
even more well-established in the law.

83. Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
84. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-28, EMINENT DOMAIN (2006),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/260/253936.html.
85. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R.R.
Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
86. See Early Evolution of Eminent Domain, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/enrd
/history-federal-use-eminent-domain.
87. Id.
88. Josh Stephens, Reclaiming the Interstates from Ike, CAL. PLAN. & DEV. REP. (Dec. 8,
2011), http://www.cp-dr.com/articles/node-3072.
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B. The U.S. Legacy of Nationalizing Companies and Industries
Even for those familiar with the widespread use of eminent domain in the United States, the nationalization of entire companies
by converting them from private to public control may seem unAmerican. Nationalization is a practice at odds with the political
and cultural reputation of the United States as an uber-capitalist
nation. Yet nationalization of companies and even entire industries
is fully permissible under U.S. law, thanks to the broad powers
granted to Congress under Article I of the Constitution and Fifth
Amendment. In its 1952 decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, the U.S. Supreme Court underscored this right: “The power of Congress to adopt such public policies as those proclaimed by
the order (nationalizing the steel industry) is beyond question. It
can authorize the taking of private property for public use.” 89
In fact, the U.S. federal government has quite often exercised
the right to nationalize. As Thomas Hanna writes in his chronicle
of this legacy, A History of Nationalization in the United States: 19172009, “The United States actually has a long and rich tradition of
nationalizing private enterprise, especially during times of eco90
nomic and social crisis.” Hanna and others cite a pattern that includes the World War I-era nationalization of the railroad industry,
which constituted one-twelfth of the U.S. economy at the time,
along with the nation’s telephone and telegraph networks, the radio industry, arms manufacturers, and pharmaceutical companies,
91
among others. During World War II, the U.S. again nationalized
railroads, along with coal mines, the nation’s gold and silver re92
serves, and manufacturers of airplanes and arms. In one highprofile case, the U.S. government nationalized some components
of the Montgomery Ward department store chain, complete with
National Guard troops carrying the resistant company CEO Sewell
93
Avery out of his Chicago office.
The World War II-era nationalizations were so voluminous that
for a period in 1945, the government was taking over on average
94
one industrial plant per week. After the war, nationalization of
railroads, oil companies, mines, and transportation facilities continued. Many of these efforts were enabled by the Defense Produc-

89.
90.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952).
THOMAS HANNA, NEXT SYS. PROJECT, A HISTORY OF NATIONALIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: 1917-2009, at 2 (2019), https://thenextsystem.org/history-ofnationalization-in-the-us.
91. Id. at 4–10.
92. Id. at 10–20.
93. Id. at 14.
94. Id. at 16.
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tion Act of 1950, which gives the President broad authority to take
action within the domestic industrial base in response to military
95
or disaster response needs. The Defense Production Act, which
includes the rights of the President to assert control over materials,
services, and facilities, has been repeatedly re-authorized by Con96
gress and remains in force today. President Trump invoked the
Act in 2018 to order electricity distributors to buy power from the
coal industry, and certain private industry leaders have urged him
97
to nationalize the country’s only rare earth minerals mine.
The regularity of mid-20th century government takeovers of private industry was likely the reason President Harry Truman was
confident that his unilateral seizure of the nation’s steel mills
would stand. But Truman’s action led to the Youngstown decision
that sets limits on executive authority for seizures. In Youngstown,
even as the Supreme Court ruled that Truman overreached, they
reaffirmed Congress’s power to pass legislation authorizing a President to conduct such seizures. Further, a majority of the justices
affirmed that, even without congressional authorization, the President possesses powers to seize private property in a more severe
emergency than the possible, but not yet occurring, steel shortage.
The emergency seizure power will be discussed further in Part VI.
The Youngstown ruling did not deter the federal government
from continuing a regular pattern of nationalizations throughout
the rest of the 20th century and into the 21st, much of it through
so-called “bailouts” of banks, automobile manufacturers, insurance
companies, railroads, and airlines, culminating in the nationalization of several of the nation’s largest companies during the eco98
nomic crisis of 2008. Like nationalizations during the world wars,
most nationalizations during economic crises have been temporary, with control over the companies eventually returned to the
original owners or new private interests.

95.
96.

Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4501–4568 (2012).
See 15 C.F.R. §700.30; JARED T. BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERVS., R43767, THE
DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950: HISTORY, AUTHORITIES, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR
CONGRESS 6 (2018).
97. Phillip Bump, Trump’s Plan To Use A Cold War-Era Law To Bolster The Coal Industry,
WASH. POST (June 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018
/06/01/trumps-plan-to-use-a-cold-war-era-law-to-bolster-the-coal-industry-explained/; Sally
Bakewell & Steven Church, This CEO Wants Trump to Nationalize the Only Rare-Earth Mine in
America, BLOOMBERG (July 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0718/trump-urged-by-ceo-to-nationalize-the-only-u-s-rare-earths-mine. In response to the need
to quickly produce medical equipment for the COVID-19 pandemic, President Trump invoked the Defense Production Act in March 2020. Charlie Savage, How the Defense Production
Act Could Yield More Masks, Ventilators and Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/us/politics/defense-production-act-virus.html.
98. See Nestor M. Davidson, Resetting the Baseline of Ownership: Takings and Investor Expectations After the Bailouts, 75 MD. L. REV. 722, 722–23 (2016).
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But there were dissenting voices about the wisdom of returning
control to private hands. After World War I, President Woodrow
Wilson and some members of Congress argued that the railroads
and radio networks were best suited to remain under federal own99
ership. The same theme was echoed a few decades later by conservative Chicago School of Economics professor Henry Simons,
who called for the government to be prepared to take over and
100
manage any industry where competition could not be ensured.
In 1969, one of the most influential economists of the mid-to-late
20th century, John Kenneth Galbraith, argued that the entire defense industry was being anti-competitive by nature and thus
101
should be nationalized. Galbraith cited as rationale the lack of
competition and the firms’ close relationship to the government as
102
the purchaser of the firms’ products. Both characteristics run
parallel to the pharmaceutical industry’s reliance on monopolies
103
and government-funded research and bulk purchases. Further,
Galbraith argued that greater efficiency and relief from the government spending distortions created by the lobbying activities of
104
privately held defense firms could come from nationalization. In
the 1960s and 1970s, some U.K. physicians and the prime minister
echoed similar arguments while proposing that at least some of the
105
pharmaceutical industry be nationalized.
There are three notable examples of the federal government
executing a full and permanent nationalization. All supply lessons
for the task of nationalizing the pharmaceutical industry. First, in
1933, Congress passed and President Franklin Roosevelt signed into law the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), creating a federal
corporation to provide electricity, flood control, and agricultural
106
and economic development to a struggling region. As with the
pharmaceutical industry currently, there were private companies

99. See HANNA, supra note 90, at 8.
100. See ALPEROVITZ, supra note 78, at 79.
101. See John Kenneth Galbraith, The Big Defense Firms Are Really Public Firms and Should be
Nationalized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1969, at SM50.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Kieran O’Brien, Researchers Ask: Should the Pharmaceutical Industry be Nationalized?,
ADVANCED SCI. NEWS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.advancedsciencenews.com/researchersask-should-the-pharmaceutical-industry-be-nationalized. In a March, 2020 BMJ article, Mariana Mazzucato and Henry Lishi Li argued that the pharmaceutical industry should be nationalized. But they went on to state the case in favor of a public option for pharmaceutical
manufacturing, and said they are not in favor of full government ownership of the sector.
Mariana Mazzucato, Henry Lishi Li & Ara Darzi, Head to Head: Is It Time to Nationalise the
Pharmaceutical Industry?, BRIT. MED. J., Mar. 4, 2020, at 1, https://doi.org/10.1136/
bmj.m769.
106. Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831–831(dd) (2012).
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already in the energy business in the TVA region when Congress
and the President took action. Nineteen of those companies, led
by the Tennessee Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the largest
power company in the state, sued to block the TVA.
But the U.S. Supreme Court in 1939 upheld the lower court’s
107
dismissal of the companies’ claim. In an analysis that provides
important guidance for the review of the pharmaceutical nationalization steps outlined in this Article, the Court found that the TVA
undoubtedly damaged the private companies’ business models, including through its aggressive use of eminent domain powers. But
the harm caused was “damnum absque injuria—a damage not con108
sequent upon the violation of any right recognized by law.” After
the Court’s ruling, the TVA and other public energy corporations
purchased TEPCO’s electric system for $78 million, and TEPCO
109
shut down its energy business.
The TVA is a successful, enduring, and popular example of full
nationalization. It is credited with helping lift impoverished areas
out of the Great Depression and continues to provide electricity to
ten million persons, with services and facilities paid for by custom110
ers and not government appropriation. TVA’s popularity as a
public entity makes the occasional proposals to sell it to private interests political non-starters. The most recent suggestion of selling
off the TVA, floated in President Trump’s proposed budget in
2018, was deemed “a looney idea” by Tennessee’s Republican Senator Lamar Alexander. “It has zero chance of becoming law,” he
111
said. The TVA’s unapologetic use of government powers, including eminent domain, to successfully subdue challenges by private
competitors is valuable precedent for the nationalization steps outlined in Part VI.
In 1970, another permanent nationalization occurred when
Congress created the National Railroad Passenger Corporation,
better known as Amtrak. As with the TVA, there were multiple private companies in the same business when the legislation was
passed. Amtrak is a quasi-public corporation, so those companies

107. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Val. Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 119 (1939).
108. Id. at 140.
109. See Tennessee Valley Authority 1933-1939, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www
.encyclopedia.com/education/news-and-education-magazines/tennessee-valley-authority1933-1939 (last updated June 12, 2020).
110. See id.
111. Press Release, Lamar Alexander, U.S. Senator, Alexander: Proposal to Sell TVA
Transmission Lines “a Looney Idea . . . with Zero Chance of Becoming Law” (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.alexander.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/2/alexander-proposal-to-selltva-transmission-lines-a-looney-idea-with-zero-chance-of-becoming-law.
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with passenger rail service were invited to shutter their services and
112
instead accept stock in Amtrak. Most did so.
Finally, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress
passed and President George W. Bush signed into law legislation to
nationalize airport security. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act directed that the Under Secretary of Transportation for
Security assume all security and screening functions at United
States airports. 113 The legislation had a devastating impact on private companies such as Huntleigh USA Corporation, which, at the
time of the Act’s passage, had contracts with approximately seventy-five airlines to cover passenger and baggage screening at thirtyfive airports across the United States.
Just like the private corporations harmed by the TVA, Huntleigh
filed suit—and suffered the same fate. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit rejected Huntleigh’s claim against the
United States under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, ruling
that the government “merely frustrated [Huntleigh’s] business interests,” but did not take its property. 114 The U.S. Supreme Court
refused to hear Huntleigh’s appeal. 115 The process that created the
Transportation Security Administration demonstrated again the
federal government’s clear power to quickly and comprehensively
nationalize an industry when public safety and attendant political
pressures are in play. It is also worth noting that the Transportation Security Administration nationalization, like that of Amtrak,
occurred under the watch of a Republican president.
IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS LAW AND THE NATIONALIZATION
OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: A FOUR-STEP PROCESS
As outlined above, the United States has a substantial history of
nationalizing firms and even entire industries in times of national
crisis when the dysfunctions of private-sector ownership pose a
danger to the well-being of the nation. Furthermore, the harm
caused by the private sector domination of the pharmaceutical
manufacturing and distribution process has advanced far beyond
prospective danger: the status quo is sickening and even killing
Americans, while also condemning millions to physical and financial suffering.

112. See Amtrak Year-Year: 1970-1972, AMTRAK (May 9, 2012), https://history.
amtrak.com/blogs/blog/the-early-years.
113. 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (2012).
114. Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1370, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
115. Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 555 U.S. 1045 (2008).
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That suffering is in significant part inflicted by corporations either fully headquartered in the United States or doing a considerable amount of business here. Measured by revenue, six of the top
ten pharmaceutical companies are based in the United States. 116
The United States represents forty-five percent of the global pharmaceutical market. 117 The damage being inflicted domestically by
these corporations can and must be relieved by the federal government using the legal tools of public seizure that have been recognized and implemented since the country’s birth.
Not only is the seizure of private property by federal, state, and
local governments squarely supported by the nation’s laws, those
laws justify nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry at a cost
far below the current value of pharmaceutical corporations. Under
U.S. constitutional law, the federal government can provide quite
limited compensation upon seizure, an important factor when nationalizing an industry that globally collects revenue of more than
118
a trillion dollars per year.
A four-step process for nationalizing the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry, with limited compensation and in full compliance with
U.S. law, would proceed as follows.
A. Step One: Congress Passes Legislation Creating and
Empowering a U.S. Medicines Agency (USMA)
As an initial action, Congress should pass legislation creating a
U.S. Medicines Agency (USMA). The USMA should be given specific authority to manufacture and distribute medicines to the U.S.
population, to issue compulsory licenses, and to seize private property to fulfill the legislation’s broad purpose to make medicines
widely available. Past similar legislation includes the Army Appropriations Act of 1916, the Smith-Connally Act/War Labor Disputes
Act of 1943, and the Defense Production Act of 1950, the last of
119
which remains in effect.
In the medicines context, similar but more narrow legislation
was proposed as recently as 2018 and again in 2019, when Senator
Elizabeth Warren and Representative Jan Schakowsky introduced
the Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, aimed at creating a new
116. Matej Mikulic, U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry - Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (May 9,
2017), https://www.statista.com/topics/1719/pharmaceutical-industry.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Army Appropriations Act of 1916, ch. 418, 39 Stat. 619–668; War Labor Disputes
(Smith-Connally) Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-79; Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. §§
4501–4568 (2012).
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federal Office of Drug Manufacturing with the power to manufacture and distribute generic medicines, where the patents have expired, and any medicines still protected by patents but eligible for
manufacture via compulsory licenses issued by the federal government. 120
As another example, when the United States faced the potential
of widespread infection from anthrax and a possible shortage of
the antibiotic ciprofloxacin in 2001, then-Representative Sherrod
Brown introduced the Public Health Emergency Medicines Act.
The legislation would have empowered the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to issue compulsory licenses for medicines patents needed to address public health emergencies. The legislation
called for “reasonable remuneration” for the use of the patents, an
amount to be determined in the context of factors including public health needs, the invention’s reliance on publicly funded re121
search, and the need to address anti-competitive practices.
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement preserves the rights of party
nations to use “a patent without the authorization of the right
holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by the government,” with “adequate remuneration” paid to
122
the patent-holder. The TRIPS language creates far broader space
for compulsory licensing legislation than the United States has ever
exercised. As discussed below, existing compulsory licensing rights
under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and 28 U.S.C. § 1498 provide a
platform for significant executive branch action to increase access
to affordable medicines. But as explained below, those statutes
have limits on their applicability. Therefore, Congress in its USMAestablishing legislation should enact a comprehensive medicinesfocused compulsory licensing rule. Such a rule would be similar to
the 2001 Public Health Emergency Medicines Act and to many of
the rules adopted in the medicines context by other TRIPS signa123
tory nations.
120. Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, S. 3775, 115th Cong. (2018); Press Release,
Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, Schakowsky, Warren Reintroduce Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, Legislation to Radically Reduce Drug Prices through Public Manufacturing of
Prescription Drugs (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/schakowsky-warren-reintroduce-affordable-drug-manufacturing-act-legislation-toradically-reduce-drug-prices-through-public-manufacturing-of-prescription-drugs.
121. Public Health Emergency Medicines Act, H.R. 3235, 107th Cong. (2001) § 158(b).
122. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 59, at art. 31.
123. See generally, ELLEN ‘T HOEN, PRIVATE PATENTS AND PUBLIC HEALTH: CHANGING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RULES FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2016); James Packard Love, Recent Examples of the Use of Compulsory Licenses on Patents, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 31,
2007), https://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls_8mar07.pdf; Maricel Estavillo, India Grants First Compulsory License, For Bayer Cancer Drug, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/03/12/india-grants-first-compulsorylicence-for-bayer-cancer-drug; Brazil: Ten Years of a Compulsory License on the HIV Drug Efavi-
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Privately held patents operate as the chief barrier to accessing
essential medicines in the United States. But there are other potential barriers to the USMA’s ability to deploy needed resources
and manufacturing techniques for producing medicines, especially
biologic medicines. The USMA legislation will need to explicitly
prevent the use of data and marketing exclusivities to bar the government from accessing the technology necessary to produce med124
icines. Potential trade secret and confidentiality agreement barriers should be acknowledged and removed as well. Again, it is
important to emphasize that such barriers are government-created
and can therefore be just as readily dismantled by government ac125
tion, as the TRIPS Agreement acknowledges. There are already
calls for the reduction or elimination of data and market exclusivity in the medicines context, along with significant recognition of
the need for a public health or public interest exception to trade
126
secrets protections.
The path to pharmaceutical industry nationalization mapped
out here contemplates the executive branch taking action based
on explicit congressional approval for all steps. Indeed, some of
the actions called for in Step Two are already statutorily authorized. The Supreme Court in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
applying reasoning later affirmed in the 2005 decision of Kelo v.
City of New London, additionally made it clear that congressional determinations regarding whether takings are justified will rarely be
questioned by courts. “Judicial deference is required because, in
our system of government, legislatures are better able to assess
what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of the taking power. . . . Thus, if a legislature, state or federal, determines

renz, MAKE MEDICINES AFFORDABLE (Oct. 2, 2017), http://makemedicinesaffordable.org/
en/brazil-10-years-of-a-compulsory-license-on-hiv-drug-efavirenz. In the early days of the
COVID-19 pandemic, at least four countries (Chile, Ecuador, Israel, and Canada) took steps
to issue compulsory licenses for medicines or medical products. Other nations pressed the
World Health Organization to collect patent rights and data so that medicines could be
made available without the monopoly price mark-ups. Ed Silverman, A Canadian Bill Would
Make It Easier To Issue Compulsory Licenses for COVID-19 Products, STAT (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/03/25/canada-compulsory-license-oronaviruscovid19.
124. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (May 2, 2018), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
ucm079031.htm#How long is exclusivity granted for? (explaining the role of exclusivities in
blocking competitor drugs).
125. Ellen ‘t Hoen et al., Data Exclusivity Exceptions and Compulsory Licensing To Promote
Generic Medicines in the European Union: A Proposal for Greater Coherence in European Pharmaceutical Legislation, J. PHARMACEUTICAL POL’Y & PRAC. 10 (2017), https://joppp
.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40545-017-0107-9.
126. Id.; Julie E. Zink, When Trade Secrecy Goes Too Far: Public Health and Safety Should
Trump Corporate Profits, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. LAW 1135 (2018), http://www
.jetlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/4_Zink-Article_Final-Review-Complete.pdf.
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there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power,
courts must defer to its determination that the taking will serve a
public use.” 127
It is also important to note that, given the national emergency at
hand, a lack of explicit congressional approval does not rob the
President of the power to act on her own while Congress proceeds
with its deliberations over an eventual course of action. Over the
years, U.S. presidents have conducted dozens of seizures without
explicit congressional approval, including President Lincoln seizing rail and telegraph lines, President Wilson seizing coal mines,
128
and President Franklin Roosevelt seizing an aviation plant.
Even when a President’s seizure was blocked by the Supreme
Court in Youngstown, a review of the Court’s decision affirms that
emergency executive action in response to the medicines crisis is
129
permissible. President Harry Truman, responding to a threatened strike that had the potential to interrupt the production of
steel needed to support the ongoing Korean War effort, ordered
his Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the coun130
try’s steel mills. In the preceding years, Truman had seized dozens of plants and industries with similar justifications. 131
In Youngstown, however, a majority of the justices held that the
President, by acting without congressional approval, had overstepped his bounds. Yet the court’s majority was careful not to
handcuff a future President who might need to act unilaterally in a
time of crisis. Seven of the nine justices declined to hold that the
President could not execute a similar seizure on her own in more
dire circumstances or when Congress had absented itself from the
132
process.
Those seven included Chief Justice Fred Vinson, who in his dissent recited multiple instances of Presidents taking bold action on
their own, including property seizures, in times of emergency.
“Presidents have taken prompt action to enforce the laws and protect the country whether or not Congress happened to provide in
advance for the particular method of execution,” he wrote.
[T]he fact that Congress and the courts have consistently
recognized and given their support to such executive action indicates that such a power of seizure has been accept-

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 683–700 (1952).
Id. at 637.
Id.
HANNA, supra note 90, at 21.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 580.
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ed throughout our history. History bears out the genius of
the Founding Fathers, who created a Government subject
to law but not left subject to inertia when vigor and initia133
tive are required.
Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion advanced a since
oft-cited framework for evaluating the limits of presidential authority to act on her own. Justice Jackson wrote,
there is a zone of twilight in which [the President] and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
134
abstract theories of law.
Thus, the majority of justices in Youngstown preserved important
options for the President to confront the current medicines crisis.
With Americans suffering and dying daily because of the crisis created by private ownership of the pharmaceutical process, Justice
Jackson’s contemplated “imperative of events” is surely in play, at
least until Congress takes the necessary steps to create a U.S. Medicines Agency.
B. Step Two: The Executive Branch Exercises Powers to Issue Compulsory
Licenses for the USMA to Manufacture Patented Medicines
Congress has already provided the executive branch with significant powers to address the current medicines crisis. Specifically,
the U.S. Code in two notable instances preserves for the federal
government the right to issue compulsory licenses.
The best-known of these legislative platforms for compulsory li135
censes was created by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. As discussed
above, Bayh-Dole unwisely enables the surrender of the patent
rights to government-discovered inventions to private corpora-

133.
134.
135.

Id. at 700 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012).
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tions. But when passing the legislation, Congress supplied an escape hatch. Responding to significant criticism of what was called a
multi-billion dollar giveaway, Congress via Bayh-Dole provided the
executive branch with the right to “march in” and issue a compul136
sory license for a federally-funded discovery.
March-in rights are triggered when the invention is not available
to the public on “reasonable terms” from the patent holder or if a
137
health or safety need arises. Those rights are limited to medicines discovered with U.S. government funding. Although that category encompasses a wide scope of initial patents, as discussed in
Part II, it may not include technology protected by secondary patents that corporations obtain after the initial rights transfer from
138
the government.
However, there are no such federal-funding-source limitations in
139
28 U.S.C § 1498’s compulsory licensing provision. In legislation
that the U.S. Court of Federal Claims analogized to eminent domain powers, the statute provides a straightforward grant of rights
to the federal government to use or manufacture patent-protected
goods for use “by and for” the government, with only the obligation to provide “reasonable and entire compensation” to the pa140
tent-holder. The statute first adopted in 1910 was amended in
1942, and the legislative history of those amendments makes it
clear that Congress granted the government this patent-bypass
right in part to address potential price-gouging by patent141
holders.
Although the existing U.S. compulsory licensing rights are underused in the medicines context, they are not mere theoretical
tools. The United States has been a global leader in issuing com142
pulsory licenses to restore competition to a monopolized market.
Compulsory licenses have been issued for medical technologies including stem cells, laser eye surgery, gene therapy, and ultrasound

136. 126 Cong. Rec. 29,898 (1980) (statement of Rep. Brown) (“I am aware of the concern that granting contractors exclusive rights to federally funded inventions is a ‘give-away’
of the taxpayers’ property.”); Hearings on S. 1215 Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., & Space of
the S. Comm. On Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 96th Cong. 400 (1979) (statement of Rep. Brown).
137. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012).
138. Id.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012).
140. Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
141. Brennan et al., supra note 54, at 300–01.
142. JAMES LOVE, U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME & WHO, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES
FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 15 (2005),
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/hiv-aids/accessto-drugs-via-compulsory-licensing-guidelines—non-voluntary-patent-use/22.pdf.
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143

imaging catheters. In the period between 2006 and 2011 alone,
U.S. courts issued six different compulsory licenses for medical
144
technologies. Beyond the health context, the United States has
also issued compulsory licenses for advances in energy technology,
methods to reduce air pollution, truck parts, plastics, personal
computers, corn seeds, microprocessors, animal vaccines, and gas145
oline.
When compulsory licenses are issued, the compensation to patent-holders has typically been set at ten percent or less of total
sales of the items manufactured by the licensees, and courts have
routinely rejected the idea of compensating the patent-holder for
146
lost profits. Importantly, when licenses have been issued to remedy anti-competitive practices, royalties are usually quite low and
often denied altogether, an approach protected by the terms of the
147
TRIPS Agreement.
When it comes to the medicines context, the U.S. Department
of Defense’s Military Medical Supply Agency during the 1950s and
1960s relied on § 1498 to procure dozens of drugs from nonlicensed manufacturers, despite U.S. corporations holding patents
on those medicines. 148 In 1994, the United States issued a compul149
sory license for the irritable bowel syndrome drug dicyclomine.
In recent decades, the U.S. has twice threatened patent-holders
with compulsory licensing in order to reduce the price of
150
HIV/AIDS medicines. In 2001, the George W. Bush administration threatened Bayer, whose antibiotic ciprofloxacin was the only
approved oral treatment for anthrax, with a compulsory license. In
response, Bayer cut the drug’s price in half and pledged a huge in151
crease in production.

143. James Love, KEI Research Note: Recent United States Compulsory Licenses, 2014:1
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L 6 (Mar. 7, 2014), http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/
Annex_A_US_Compulsory_Licenses_7Mar2014_8_5x11.pdf.
144. James Love, Open Letter to Those Who Collectively Produced the May 23, 2012 Statement to
the WIPO SCP on the Topics of Patents and Health, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (May 25, 2012),
https://www.keionline.org/21854.
145. Love, supra note 143.
146. Amy Kapczynski & Aaron Kesselheim, Government Patent Use: A Legal Approach To
Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 791, 793 (2016); Brennan et al., supra note 54,
at 311.
147. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 59, at art. 40; LOVE, supra note 142, at 12.
148. Brennan et al., supra note 54, at 305.
149. The Dow Chemical Company et al., 59 Fed. Reg. 34,625, 34,626–27 (F.T.C. 1994)
(proposed consent agreement).
150. Jennifer Penman & Fran Quigley, Better Late Than Never: How the U.S. Government
Can and Should Use Bayh-Dole March-In Rights to Respond to the Medicines Access Crisis, 54
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 71, 188 (2017).
151. Keith Bradsher & Edmund Andrews, A Nation Challenged: U.S. Says Bayer Will Cut
Cost of Its Anthrax Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/24/
business/a-nation-challenged-cipro-us-says-bayer-will-cut-cost-of-its-anthrax-drug.html.
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In Step Two, the U.S. government should immediately and
thoroughly exercise its existing compulsory licensing rights to cre152
ate a supply of low-cost medicines. Some urgently needed medicines would include insulin and asthma inhalers. Both are in high
demand, with well-documented barriers to access due to private
153
pharmaceutical company pricing.
This is not the first call for broader use of Bayh-Dole march-in
154
rights and § 1498 for medicines access. Indeed, some might argue that more robust exercise of existing compulsory licensing
rights will be a sufficient response to the current medicines crisis.
But the federal government response to the medicines crisis cannot stop at Step Two, no matter how broadly conducted. The best
argument for pressing forward is revealed in the contrast between
the clear remedies for responding to a medicines pricing crisis via
march-in rights and § 1498 and the government’s overall unwill155
ingness to avail itself of these remedies.
Consider that in the thirty-nine-year history of the Bayh-Dole
Act, the federal government has not once exercised the march-in
156
rights created by the legislation. Democrat and Republican ad152. In 1983, Congress passed the U.S. Orphan Drug Act, an effort to spur research for
diseases that affect a small number of people, or otherwise do not suggest a lucrative U.S.
market for private corporations. The law provides those corporations an early-stage push, in
the form of research grants and increased tax credits, along with a late-stage pull from government-granted market exclusivity for the resulting drugs. ORPHANET, About Orphan Drugs
(2015), http://www.orpha.net/national/AU-EN/index/about-orphan-drugs. Since nationalizing the pharmaceutical industry removes the distorting profit motive from research prioritization, the U.S. Medicines Agency would be able to focus on developing and making
available medicines such as “orphan drugs” without concern over profitability.
153. Fran Quigley, Opinion, This Free Clinic Is a Study in the US Healthcare Struggle, NAT’L
CATHOLIC REP. (July 2, 2019), https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/free-clinic-studyus-healthcare-struggle.
154. Penman & Quigley, supra note 150, at 213; Kapczynski & Kesselheim, supra note
146, at 794.
155. The pharmaceutical industry has not only been able to block implementation of
the pro-patient terms in the Bayh-Dole Act, it has taken the similarly pro-patient intentions
of the 1983 Orphan Drug Act and leveraged many of the incentives created by the legislation to support development of medicines that turn out to be enormously profitable to corporations. Sarah Jane Tribble & Sidney Lupkin, Government Investigation Finds Flaws in the
FDA’s Orphan Drug Program, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 30, 2018), https://khn.org/news/
government-investigation-finds-flaws-in-the-fdas-orphan-drug-program. A high-profile example of the for-profit gaming of the orphan drug system occurred in the early days of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Gilead Sciences requested from the Food and Drug Administration
orphan drug status for potential coronavirus treatment remdesivir. Gilead’s request was an
apparent effort to get the benefits of orphan drug designation before official confirmation
that one of the most widespread diseases in history was far from a “rare disease.” Under
pressure from advocates, Gilead withdrew the request. Sidney Lupkin, Gilead Declines ‘Rare
Disease’ Status For Experimental Coronavirus Drug, NPR (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2020/03/25/821534016/drugmaker-asks-fda-to-rescind-rare-diseasestatus-perks-for-covid-19-drug.
156. Ryan Whalen, The Bayh-Dole Act & Public Rights in Federally Funded Inventions: Will the
Agencies Ever Go Marching In?, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1083 (2015). The industry has also
managed to rebound from the setbacks from the massive global advocacy that led to the
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ministrations alike, at times urged on by former senators-turneddrug-industry-lobbyists, have stretched the boundaries of credulity
by concluding that the law’s requirement to make medicines avail157
able on “reasonable terms” does not refer to affordability. Thus,
even the current deadly pricing crisis has not led to a single marchin action, despite an extensive legislative history showing that affordability was precisely what Congress had in mind when preserving the government’s rights to bypass the patents via compulsory
158
licensing. The explanation for this remarkable breach of duty is
clear: the pharmaceutical industry has succeeded in a multi-decade
process of regulatory capture. The industry’s success is thanks to its
generous campaign contributions, lobbying expenditures, and the
revolving door between pharmaceutical management, federal
159
agency leadership, and even congressional leadership.
With widespread issuances of compulsory licenses in Step Two,
the executive branch could finally reverse this shameful legacy. But
dramatic reduction in prices for antiretroviral medicines to treat HIV/AIDS and the U.S.focused pushback against ciprofloxacin costs in the face of a potential anthrax crisis. The
reduction in the costs of one set of medicines has not prevented overall costs from consistently climbing. SMITH & SIPLON, supra note 63; Bradsher & Andrews, supra note 151. Beyond
the pharmaceutical context, there is a quite recent example of the danger that exists when
an industry is left intact with enormous resources and an existential motive to thwart the
reform intended by legislation. Despite the fact that the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was considered to be the most sweeping banking regulatory legislation since the 1930s, the financial industry has been able to block much of its
most impactful intentions from taking effect. Gary Rivlin, How Wall Street Defanged DoddFrank, THE NATION (Apr. 30, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-wallstreet-defanged-dodd-frank (“The same financial behemoths that had fought so ferociously
to block Dodd-Frank were not going to let the mere fact of the bill’s passage ruin their
plans. ‘Halftime,’ shrugged Scott Talbott, chief lobbyist for the Financial Services
Roundtable, a lobbying group representing one hundred of the country’s largest financial
institutions. . . . Whereas commercial banks such as Wells Fargo, Citigroup and JPMorgan
Chase, along with their trade groups, spent $55 million lobbying in 2010 (the year DoddFrank became law), they would collectively spend $61 million in 2011 and again in 2012,
according to OpenSecrets.org. ”). Further examples of regulated-but-not-nationalized industries regrouping as once-again exploitative entities include the government antitrust efforts
to break up manipulative monopolies that were successful in the short term but saw the corporations eventually reconsolidate. ALPEROVITZ, supra note 78, at 77–79.
157. Francis S. Collins, Letter from Francis Collins to Andrew Goldman, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH,
(June 20, 2016), https://www.keionline.org/sites/default/files/Final-Response-Goldman6.20.2016.pdf; Birch Bayh & Bob Dole, Our Law Helps Patients Get New Drugs Sooner,
WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/04
/11/our-law-helps-patients-get-new-drugs-sooner/d814d22a-6e63-4f06-8da3-d9698
552fa24/?utm_term=.c5ffebd548d2; Alicia Mundy, Just the Medicine, WASH. MONTHLY,
(Nov./Dec. 2016), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/novemberdecember-2016/
just-the-medicine.
158. Penman & Quigley, supra note 150, at 187–88.
159. OPENSECRETS.ORG, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., Industries (2019), https://www
.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/industries?cycle=2019; Sheila Kaplan, From FDA Expert to
Biotech Insider: The Drug Industry Thrives on the Revolving Door, STAT (Sept. 27, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/27/fda-biopharama-revolving-door-study; David Kirkpatrick & Duff Wilson, One Grand Deal Too Many Costs Lobbyist His Job, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/13/health/policy/13pharm.html.
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the issuance of compulsory licenses is not a full taking, as it does
not extinguish the rights of patent-holders to continue to produce
and sell their medicines. When critical medicines patents continue
to be held by private corporations, even vigorous licensing of those
medicines to others cannot prevent the re-capture of the system by
those politically powerful patent-holders. Therefore, outright seizures will be necessary to prevent backsliding into another profiteering-caused medicines crisis.
C. Step Three: The USMA Executes Seizures that Are Exempt from the Fifth
Amendment’s Compensation Requirement
As noted above, the Fifth Amendment’s dual protection of government seizure rights and compensation has governed centuries
of eminent domain practices. As courts have interpreted the Takings Clause in the context of specific disputes, two principles have
emerged with particular application to the task of nationalizing the
pharmaceutical sector.
First, in determining whether a Fifth Amendment taking has occurred, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City developed a framework for considering the
government’s level of interference with reasonable “distinct investment-based expectations.” 160 The more the private property
owner reasonably anticipated that she would enjoy unencumbered
rights, the greater the obligation of the government to compensate
for interfering with them. This holds true even if the governmental
interference is only by regulation that severely limits the owner’s
use of property—a so-called regulatory taking.
Second, although the long history of government takings in the
United States has been dominated by the seizure or regulation of
real property (i.e. land and attached buildings), the Supreme
Court in Horne v. Department of Agriculture made clear that it considers some government seizures of personal property—in that
case, a portion of a California farmer’s raisin crop—to also be sub161
ject to the limits of the Takings Clause.
Given these two principles, it is difficult to envision the U.S. government being able to execute a full seizure of all pharmaceutical
industry assets without triggering a constitutional obligation to
provide some level of reimbursement in the spirit of “just compensation.” A broad government takeover of medicines development,

160.
161.

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 360-61 (2015).
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manufacturing, and distribution would undoubtedly be achieved
more quickly and efficiently via federalization of pharmaceutical
corporations’ plants and key personnel, as was the case in multiple
past U.S. corporate seizures. What should be the amount of compensation for such seizures?
The broad rule in government seizure cases is that the dispossessed owner should be compensated for the “highest and best
use” of their property. U.S. courts have interpreted the highest and
best use standard to mean “[t]he reasonably probable and legal
use of [property], which is physically possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value.” 162
But here, the argument is that the amount of compensation due
to pharmaceutical corporations upon seizure is much more limited
than the baseline amount of highest and best use would suggest.
Fifth Amendment takings law provides strong arguments in support of “just compensation” upon nationalization being far below
any current value estimation for the corporations that make up
that industry. Those value estimates are dependent on government-granted patents, heavy government subsidies, and widespread malfeasance that has boosted profits at the expense of the
public welfare. All of those factors support the nationalization of
the industry at a cost far less than its present value.
1. Patents Are Not Property in Fifth Amendment Takings Context.
When executing the seizure of private pharmaceutical company
assets, the U.S. government’s compensation obligations are significantly reduced if we accept that corporate-held drug patents are
not “property” in the context of the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause. This is a conclusion with immense impact, since the value
of patents represents the lion’s share of the assets of pharmaceutical companies. For example, the corporation AbbVie in 2018 relied on a single patent-protected medicine, Humira, for nearly $20
163
billion of its revenue, fifty-eight percent of the company’s total.
For Celgene and Bristol-Meyers Squibb, two patent-protected drugs

162. Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 350 (2006) (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc.
v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 156 (1990)).
163. AbbVie Reports Full-Year and Fourth-Quarter 2018 Financial Results, ABBVIE
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://news.abbvie.com/news/abbvie-reports-full-year-and-fourth-quarter2018-financial-results.htm.
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accounted for more than sixty percent of their revenue in that
164
same year.
This reliance on patent protection is not an anomaly. A few
years earlier, a dozen of the companies that produced the twentyfive best selling drugs in the world were each found to be collecting more than ten percent of their revenue from just a single pa165
tent-protected medicine. In 2015, Gilead Science’s $32 billion
revenue stream topped the Barron’s rankings of the 500 largest
166
public companies. But that world-leading revenue came almost
solely from a single group of closely-related patent-protected medi167
cines used to treat Hepatitis C.
The enormous monopoly-provided boost from patents allows
corporations to charge as much as one thousand times their manu168
facturing costs. Without that boost, their revenue collapses.
When patents expire and competitors enter the market to sell the
drugs at prices as low as ten percent of the monopoly price, pharmaceutical companies’ value can tumble off what is known as the
“patent cliff.” The pharmaceutical industry lives in constant fear of
that cliff. 169 Industry analysts report that between 2018 and 2024,
patent expirations in the prescription drug industry are expected
to put up to $251 billion in sales at risk. 170
These patent monopolies are a government creation. As noted
above, they are also a recent one. Late into the 20th century, dozens of countries still refused to grant patents on essential medicines. Even today the U.N. Commissioner on Human Rights takes
pains to emphasize the primacy of human rights obligations over

164. Naomi Kresge & John Lauerman, Big Pharma Faces The Curse Of The Billion-Dollar
Blockbuster, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2019), https ://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201901-11/big-pharma-faces-the-curse-of-the-billion-dollar-blockbuster.
165. Max Nisen, The Drugs Big Pharma Depends On The Most, QUARTZ (Mar. 2, 2015),
https://qz.com/353008/cash-cows/.
166. Jacqueline Doherty, The Barron’s 500: Gilead Sciences Ranks No. 1, BARRON’S (May 2,
2015), https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-barrons-500-an-exclusive-ranking-1430541320;
Press Release, Gilead Scis., Inc., Gilead Sciences Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2015
Financial Results (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/press-room/pressreleases/2016/2/gilead-sciences-announces-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2015-financialresults.
167. Gilead Scis., Inc., supra note 166.
168. Simon Collins, 1,000-Fold Mark-Up for Drug Prices in High Income Countries Blocks Access
to HIV, HCV and Cancer Drugs, BODY PRO (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.thebodypro.com
/article/1000-fold-mark-up-for-drug-prices-in-high-income-c.
169. See Merck and Pfizer Downgrades on Patent Cliff Concerns Signal Importance of Patents to
Pharma, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/02/23/analysts
-downgrade-merck-and-pfizer-on-patent-cliff-exclusivity-concerns/id=106497/.
170. Samantha DiGrande, Second Patent Cliff Lies Ahead for Pharma with $251 Billion in
Sales at Risk by 2024, CTR. FOR BIOSIMILARS (June 7, 2018), https://www.centerfor
biosimilars.com/news/second-patent-cliff-lies-ahead-for-pharma-with-251-billion-in-sales-atrisk-by-2024.
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the discretionary economic policies that can create intellectual
171
property such as patents.
U.S. courts have also recognized the ephemeral, dependent nature of patents, holding in two prominent cases that they do not
meet the definition of property under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. 172 Under U.S. law, the federal government may not be
sued for actions like patent infringement unless it has waived its
immunity, as it has via statutes such as the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 173 The U.S. Supreme Court, in Schillinger v. United States, and
the Federal Circuit Court, in Zoltek Corp. v. United States, both held
that the constitution does not include any waiver of the federal
government’s rights to sovereign immunity from liability for infringement of patent rights. Both courts flatly rejected claims for a
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause “just compensation” remedy for
174
government infringement on a privately held patent.
However, the Supreme Court in 2015, in the aforementioned
raisins seizure case of Horne v. Department of Agriculture, created
some confusion on the question of whether patents are property
175
under the Takings Clause. The Horne Court repeated the language of an 1882 decision, James v. Campbell, stating that patentholders do possess the entitlement to just compensation for gov176
ernment appropriation. Pointing to the Horne and James language, some legal academics have since argued that patents should
be considered property under the Takings Clause. 177
Despite that claim, the argument in support of patents being
considered takings-applicable property is unsupported by the most
178
relevant sources of law. Neither the Court in Horne nor in James
actually ruled on patent questions, making their pronouncements
dicta on this issue. By contrast, the Schillinger Court did rule on the
patent takings question, rejecting the idea of patents as takings
property. And the Schillinger Court addressed the question a dozen

171. U.N. OHCHR, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, 53d Sess.,
25th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000).
172. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894); Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442
F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2006), vacated on reh’g en banc, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
173. The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law—as opposed to a promise
of just compensation for government seizure—has been held to apply to a wider definition
of property than the Takings Clause. For example, welfare benefits have been held to represent sufficient property interests to invoke due process guarantees of review if the government takes them away. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
174. Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 172; Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d at 1351.
175. Horne v. Dep’t. of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 359-360 (2015).
176. Id. (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1881)).
177. Gregory Dolin & Irena D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719, 771
(2016).
178. Camilla A. Hrdy & Ben Picozzi, The AIA is Not a Taking: A Response To Dolin & Manta, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 475 (2016).
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years after James, making it the Supreme Court’s most recent case
179
on the issue.
Schillinger was decided in 1894, but it holds up to modern standards. As mentioned above, Fifth Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence places great emphasis on how the government taking
may interfere with the impacted party’s reasonable “investmentbacked expectations” of uninterrupted, unencumbered owner180
ship. In the 1992 case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the
Supreme Court made it clear those expectations are limited in instances where the government exercises a “traditionally high degree of control,” to the extent that “new regulation might even
181
render his property economically worthless.” The application in
the medicines context is clear. There is no U.S. corporation holding a patent on a medicine that has not known from day one that
the granting of a patent is a discretionary government action. They
know, or should know, that the federal government retains rights
under the Bayh-Dole Act and § 1498, as well as sweeping compulsory licensing powers protected by the TRIPS Agreement, to immediately and summarily access any patented invention or technology.
Section 1498 provides a statutory path for the patent-holder to
receive compensation for government use. But its existence and
legislative history further support the conclusion that patents are
not Fifth Amendment takings property. In 2012, the Federal Circuit Court in Zoltek noted that § 1498 was originally passed as the
Patent Act of 1910, sixteen years after the Schillinger court held that
there was no constitutional requirement for just compensation for
182
government patent infringement. Section 1498, the Zoltek court
noted, was Congress’s effort to provide a remedy to patent-holders
via statute where one did not exist by virtue of the constitution.183
Congress’s decision after Schillinger to waive federal government
immunity from those claims further undermines any argument
that there is a constitutional guarantee to such compensation. The
Supreme Court refused to hear the patent-holder’s appeal from
Zoltek.
Assuming § 1498 remains in its current iteration at the time of
nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry, the United States
would be subject to that statutory obligation to provide “reasonable

179. Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 172; see also Christy, Inc. v. United States, 141 Fed. Cl. 641,
658 (2019) (holding that patents are not considered property for Takings Clause purposes);
180.
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (2018).
181. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 (1992).
182. Zoltek v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
183. Id.

SUMMER 2020]

Tell Me How It Ends

793

and entire compensation” to the patent-holder for use of the patent. Of course, that is a congressionally-granted remedy to the patent-holder, and Congress could amend § 1498 to exempt pharmaceutical patent infringements from that waiver of sovereign
immunity. That congressional action could even be added to Step
One contemplated here. Even if § 1498 remains undisturbed, however, the compensation level under the statute has traditionally
been set far below the windfall gains currently realized by the patent-possessing private pharmaceutical companies.
The most current and applicable law holds that patent seizures
do not trigger the “just compensation” obligation under the Fifth
Amendment. The statutory remedy of compensation exists alone
and can be removed by Congress. The government can and should
seize medicines patents in Step Three and can do so without a constitutional obligation to compensate.
2. Most of the Value of Pharmaceutical Corporations Comes From
Discretionary Government Actions—Including Early and Latestage Research, Patent Licensure, Tax Breaks, and Government
Purchases—and the Government Should not be Required to
Compensate for that Lost Value Upon Seizure.
Although the windfall profits from the current U.S. pharmaceutical system flow into private hands, those profits and the assets that
generate them are largely the products of discretionary government action. This phenomenon is best illustrated by a simple walkthrough of the pharmaceutical process, from the laboratory to a
patient’s medicine cabinet.
As noted above, the early-stage research that forms the most
risky and lengthy segment of the medicines development process is
184
funded almost entirely by government resources. For the 210
new medicines approved by the FDA from 2010 to 2016, every one
185
traces its origins back to government-funded research. Next, the
Bayh-Dole Act prods the government to award to private entities
the monopoly patents that create most of the financial value of
186
these medicines. When those private companies conduct followup research and market their eventual product, the government

184. FRAN QUIGLEY, PRESCRIPTION FOR THE PEOPLE: AN ACTIVIST’S GUIDE TO MAKING
MEDICINE AFFORDABLE FOR ALL 87–91 (2017).
185. Ekaterina G. Cleary et al., Contribution Of NIH Funding To New Drug Approvals 2010–
2016, 115 PNAS 2329 (2018), https://www.pnas.org/content/115/10/2329.
186. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012).
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allows them to deduct those costs from their tax obligations. And
187
much of the late-stage research is federally funded as well.
Finally, federal and state governments step in to become the in188
dustry’s number one customer for the medicines produced. The
prices they pay are artificially enhanced not just by governmentgranted patents, but also by the congressional decision in 2003 to
prevent the Medicare system from using its substantial purchasing
189
power to negotiate down the cost of the medicines it buys. That
no-negotiations promise costs the U.S. government as much as $49
190
billion each year.
The government-dependent nature of the pharmaceutical industry business model has alarmed politically conservative advocates who typically support private industry. In 2018, Cato Institute
scholars and law professors, Charles Silver and David Hyman,
wrote in favor of eliminating the patent system for medicines.
“Some conservatives defend this system on free-market grounds,
arguing that any measure that reduces drug company profits will
necessarily reduce innovation,” they wrote. “But we are firm believers in the free market, and we think the system is a mess. It is deformed by monopolies and by misguided incentives tied to the
payment system.” 191
The year before, conservative activist Mytheos Holt wrote in the
American Spectator that “high drug prices are a result of specific
government policy: something that decisively argues against the
notion that the market for drugs is in any way free.” Holt wrote
that drug companies were benefitting from a “corporate welfaredriven pricing regime,” and that legislation aimed at limiting patent-holders’ ability to ward off generic alternatives was performing
an important service by “smoking out the anticonservative nature

187. Rahul K. Nayak et al., Public Sector Financial Support for Late Stage Discovery of New
Drugs in the United States: Cohort Study, BRIT. MED. J., Oct. 23, 2019, at 1, https://doi.org/
10.1136/bmj.l5766.
188. Kerry Young, Federal Government Emerges as Top Health Buyer in New Analysis, CQ ROLL
CALL (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletter-article/
2016/dec/federal-government-emerges-top-health-buyer-new-analysis; see also Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Updates Drug Dashboards with Prescription Drug Pricing and Spending Data (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-updates-drugdashboards-prescription-drug-pricing-and-spending-data (discussing the U.S. government’s
overall spending on prescription medications for public insurance programs).
189. Peter Sullivan, CBO: Pelosi Bill To Lower Drug Prices Saves Medicare $345 Billion,
THE HILL (Oct. 11, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/465491-cbo-pelosi-bill-tolower-drug-prices-saves-medicare-345-billion.
190. Id.
191. Charles Silver & David Hyman, Here’s a Plan To Fight High Drug Prices That Could
Unite Libertarians and Socialists, CATO INST. (June 21, 2018), https://www.cato.org/
publications/commentary/heres-plan-fight-high-drug-prices-could-unite-libertarianssocialists.

SUMMER 2020]

Tell Me How It Ends

795

of an industry that conservatives have been willing to accept uncrit192
ically as an ally for far too long.”
Beyond creating fissures in the free-market political support system that drug corporations have traditionally relied upon, the government-dependent nature of the pharmaceutical industry carries
significance when determining just compensation for seizures.
Common sense suggests that the seizing government should not be
required to compensate private companies for any value that exists
because of the government’s own actions. The Supreme Court
agrees.
In the 1973 case United States v. Fuller, the Court held that Arizona ranchers were not entitled to Fifth Amendment takings compensation for the value of their seized land created by government
193
permits for livestock grazing on adjacent federal lands. The
Court reviewed multiple cases holding that constitutionallymandated just compensation does not include value created by
government action, including when value was increased by anticipated government wartime boat purchases or planned government
development on seized land. The Fuller Court wrote that “[t]hese
cases go far toward establishing the general principle that the Government as condemnor may not be required to compensate a
condemnee for elements of value that the Government has
created . . . .” 194
The logic of this principle was recently explained by the conservative legal scholar and property rights activist Roger Pilon, writing for the Cato Institute where he serves as chair of constitutional
studies:
[W]hen government actions incidentally reduce property
values, but no rights are violated because nothing that belongs free and clear to the owner is taken, no compensation is due. If the government closes a military base or a
neighborhood school, for example, or builds a new highway distant from the old one with its commercial enterprises, property values may decline as a result—but nothing was
taken. We own our property and all the legitimate uses that

192. Mytheos Holt, The Free Market Is Coming for Pharma, AM. SPECTATOR (Feb. 13, 2017),
https://spectator.org/the-free-market-is-coming-for-pharma.
193. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
194. Id. at 492.

796

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 53:4

go with it, not the value in our property, which is a function
195
of many ever-changing factors.
The path to nationalization here includes the exercise of compulsory licensing power for pharmaceutical patents. Undoubtedly,
that action will significantly reduce the government-created value
currently enjoyed by pharmaceutical corporations. But those corporations have no right to that value, and it should be excluded
from the calculation of what equals “just compensation” for seizure. As the Supreme Court stated in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
“government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power.” 196 The value possessed by pharmaceutical corporations due
to discretionary government actions—charging prices inflated by
government-granted patent monopolies and by selling medicines
developed by government research—are in that category. Therefore upon seizure, the corporations are not entitled to compensation for that value.
3. The “Nuisance Exception” to Fifth Amendment Takings Law
Along with Civil and Criminal Forfeiture Laws Exempt the
Government from Any Obligation to Compensate Pharmaceutical
Corporations for the Substantial Value Gained from Actions that
Harm Public Health.
Much of the suffering and death occurring during the current
national medicines crisis can be attributed to ill-advised government choices. The government grants private entities patent
awards for government-funded discoveries via the Bayh-Dole Act,
allows take-it-or-leave-it pricing via the 2003 Medicare program ban
on negotiating down the price of medicines, and permits corporations to distort the market by gifting billions of dollars each year to
prescribing physicians for non-research purposes such as honorar197
ia, luxury goods, and travel. These government actions, along

195. ROGER PILON, CATO INST., Cato Handbook for Policymakers 178 (2017), https://www
.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/catohandbook-policymakers-8th-edition-16_0.pdf.
196. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
197. Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and its Influence on Physicians and Patients, PEW (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/
fact-sheets/2013/11/11/persuading-the-prescribers-pharmaceutical-industry-marketing-andits-influence-on-physicians-and-patients.
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with the broad retreat from the wise legacy of not awarding private
monopolies for essential medicines, have all contributed to the cri198
sis at hand.
There is no legal violation when pharmaceutical corporations
work within existing regulatory structures to take advantage of a
system rigged in their favor. But the corporations have not been
content with fully ethical, legal opportunism. Instead, they have
engaged in a wide range of well-documented, and pervasive practices that are either outright illegal or systematically abusive, inflicting grievous harm to public health in the process.
Industry practices such as price-fixing, abuses of the patent process, overcharging government programs, and a dizzying array of
illegal marketing schemes have long been the subject of government investigations, criminal charges, and civil suits for misbehavior. There is a reason why the oft-sanctioned industry returns again
and again to these practices, despite enduring billions of dollars in
fines and penalties: these practices contribute substantially to the
value of the companies. Under the nuisance exception to the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause requirement for compensation,
none of that value should be recovered by corporations when nationalization occurs.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to estimate the dollar
amount of that ill-gotten value, but it is worth noting the breathtaking extent of the pharmaceutical industry’s malfeasance. When the
advocacy organization Public Citizen surveyed the major financial
settlements and court judgments between pharmaceutical companies and federal and state governments from 1991 through 2017, it
found that drugmakers entered into 412 settlements totaling $38.6
billion in criminal and civil penalties. 199 These penalties included
sanctions for dozens of major violations of the U.S. False Claims
Act, the Anti-Kickback Statute, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
and multiple state laws prohibiting Medicaid fraud.
The most commonly-cited ethical offense involved violating restrictions on promoting off-label uses of products, prohibitions
that exist because those uses have not been analyzed for possibly

198. Charles Ornstein et al., We Found Over 700 Doctors Who Were Paid More Than a Million
Dollars by Drug and Medical Device Companies, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www
.propublica.org/article/we-found-over-700-doctors-who-were-paid-more-than-a-milliondollars-by-drug-and-medical-device-companies.
199. Sammy Almashat et al., Twenty-Seven Years of Pharmaceutical Industry Criminal and Civil Penalties: 1991 Through 2017, PUB. CITIZEN (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.citizen.org/
article/twenty-seven-years-of-pharmaceutical-industry-criminal-and-civil-penalties-1991through-2017.
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200

dangerous effects. For example, Pfizer was charged in 2009 with
illegally promoting off-label uses of the pain medicine Bextra,
201
which was later pulled from the market for safety reasons. GlaxoSmithKline was fined $12 billion in response to allegations it illegally promoted its antidepressant Paxil for use in adolescents, and
Eli Lilly paid $1.4 billion in response to claims it unlawfully promoted its antipsychotic drug Zyprexa—even to the point of train202
ing its sales persons in how to avoid legal requirements. Despite
the large settlements, the Public Citizen report and other advocates say the illegal marketing practices continue to be rampant.
“Marketing departments of many drug companies don’t respect
any boundaries of professionalism or the law,” says Jerry Avorn, a
203
professor at Harvard Medical School.
Multiple lawsuits and government investigations find that manufacturers of insulin, a drug that yields $24 billion in annual revenue, have engaged in illegal price-fixing for decades. 204 The three
companies that dominate the global market for insulin—Sanofi,
Novo Nordisk, and Eli Lilly—have raised the list prices of their
products multiple times over many years in lock step. Current prices can reach as high as fifty times the estimated manufacturing
cost. 205 “Instead of falling prices, as one might expect after decades
of competition, three drug makers who make different versions of
insulin have continuously raised prices on this life-saving medication,” members of Congress wrote in 2016 when demanding the
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission launch
an investigation into price-fixing. 206

200. Andreas Vilhelmsson et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Off-Label Promotion and SelfRegulation: A Document Analysis of Off-Label Promotion Rulings by the United Kingdom Prescription
Medicines Code of Practice Authority 2003–2012, 13 PLOS MED. e1001945, e1001946 (2016),
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001945.
201. David Evans, When Drug Makers’ Profits Outweigh Penalties, WASH. POST (Mar. 21,
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/19/AR20100319
05578.html.
202. Id.; Adriane Fugh-Berman, How Basic Scientists Help the Pharmaceutical Industry Market
Drugs, 11 PLOS BIOLOGY e1001716 (2013), https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?
id=10.1371/journal.pbio.1001716.
203. Evans, supra note 201.
204. $24 Billion Insulin Markets – Global Intelligence Database 2012-2018 & 2019-2023,
GLOBE NEWSWIRE (May 29, 2019), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/05
/29/1856512/0/en/24-Billion-Insulin-Markets-Global-Intelligence-Database-2012-20182019-2023.html; Katie Thomas, Drug Makers Accused of Fixing Prices on Insulin, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/health/drugmakers-lawsuit-insulindrugs.html?_r=0.
205. See Dzintars Gotham et al., Production Costs and Potential Prices for Biosimilars of Human Insulin and Insulin Analogues, BRIT. MED. J. GLOBAL HEALTH, Sept. 25, 2018, at 1, 5,
https://gh.bmj.com/content/3/5/e000850.
206. Ed Silverman, Bernie Sanders Calls for Federal Investigation of Insulin Makers for Price
Collusion, STAT, (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/11/03/
sanders-insulin-investigation.
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The industry’s manipulation of the patent process is likely its
most vigorous and lucrative abuse of the laws and regulatory systems. The 2018 report by Initiative for Medicines, Access and
Knowledge (I-MAK) revealed that the twelve top-selling drugs in
the United States average 125 patent applications per drug, many
of them frivolous, giving each drug an average of thirty-eight years
of attempted patent protections—far beyond the baseline twenty207
year patent life. Additional patents are often sought for minor
changes to the original medicine or adjustments to the dosage or
delivery system, such as transforming multiple doses into a once-a208
day pill or even turning a tablet into a capsule. This “patent
thicketing,” process has been condemned by commentators from
the USA Today editorial board (“abusive tactics”, “shameless
gamesmanship”) to U.S. Senators (“manipulating the patent system”) to public health advocates (“abuse of the patent system”). 209
Yet it continues. AbbVie, the manufacturer of the world’s topselling drug, Humira, has sought a remarkable two hundred and
forty-seven patents on its use. Humira remains monopoly-protected
in the United States until 2023, despite the fact that its main in210
gredient has been off-patent for several years. In 2015, AbbVie’s
CEO bragged about the effectiveness of this tactic, “Any company
seeking to market a biosimilar version of Humira will have to contend with this extensive patent estate, which AbbVie intends to en211
force vigorously.”
The massive impact that abuse of the patent process has on
medicine prices, and thus the value of these corporations, is clear.
I-MAK’s analysis of the patent thicket-protected twelve best-selling
drugs in the United States showed that from 2012 to 2018, the
prices of eleven of these best-sellers rose an average of eighty percent. By one analysis, AbbVie makes nearly $50 million in addi-

207. I-MAK, supra note 41, at 11.
208. Robin Feldman, ‘One-and-Done’ for New Drugs Could Cut Patent Thickets and Boost Generic Competition, STAT (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/11/drugpatent-protection-one-done.
209. Editorial, How Big Pharma Plays Games With Drug Patents And How To Combat It, USA
TODAY (July 18, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/07/18/big-pharmaplays-games-drug-patents-you-pay-editorials-debates/1769746001; Press Release, Richard
Durbin, U.S. Senator, Durbin Gives Pharma Fleece Award to Drug Companies Abusing Patent System (May 15, 2019), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/
durbin-gives-pharma-fleece-award-to-drug-companies-abusing-patent-system; David Branigan,
Brief: Report - Patent Abuse a Leading Cause of High Drug Prices in US, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.ip-watch.org/2018/08/03/report-patent-abuse-leading-causehigh-drug-prices-us.
210. See Ellen ‘t Hoen, Humiragate: Abbvie’s Desperate Attempts to Keep Its Monopoly,
MEDICINES L. & POL’Y (Mar. 27, 2019), https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2019/03/
humiragate-abbvies-desperate-attempts-to-keep-its-monopoly.
211. QUIGLEY, supra note 184, at 79.
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tional revenue per day on Humira due to extended patents. Little wonder that the corporations are known to deploy “floors full of
lawyers” to extend patents, overwhelming regulatory agencies and
213
any comparatively underfunded opposition to patent thicketing.
Economists studying the global intellectual property system have
concluded that this phenomenon has led to many weak patents
214
that go unchallenged.
Another way that pharmaceutical companies extend monopolies
via unethical behavior is through so-called “pay-for-delay” schemes.
For a would-be generic or biosimilar manufacturer, the patent
thickets present a significant challenge. Before it can sell its product, the generic manufacturer faces costly, years-long, thicket-citing
lawsuits filed by the deep-pocketed corporation that holds the patents. Knowing this, the patent-holding pharmaceutical companies
offer would-be competitors a substantial sum in return for an
agreement to postpone the entry of a generic drug into the market. A recent analysis showed that more than one-third of generic
medicines approved by the FDA between 2016 and 2018 were not
215
yet on the market, often because of thicketing and pay-for-delay.
Pay-for-delay has been described as “one of the sleaziest and most
216
blatantly self-serving” of all anti-competitive practices. It is also
effective. The Federal Trade Commission estimates that the extended monopoly price boost from pay-for-delay schemes costs
217
U.S. patients an extra $3.5 billion each year.
Upon government seizure, none of the value extracted by these
manipulative practices should be reimbursed to pharmaceutical
corporations. The Supreme Court has often explained that the just
compensation guarantee “was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all

212. AbbVie’s $19.9 billion increase in annual revenue amounts to $54.5 million per day.
See Press Release, Abbvie, AbbVie Reports Full-Year and Fourth-Quarter 2018 Financial Results (Jan. 25, 2019), https://news.abbvie.com/news/abbvie-reports-full-year-and-fourthquarter-2018-financial-results.htm. When faced with generic competition in other countries,
AbbVie cut the price of Humira by almost ninety percent. ‘t Hoen, supra note 210.
213. See Priti Radhakrishnan, Pharma’s Secret Weapon to Keep Drug Prices High, STAT
(June 14, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/06/14/secondary-patent-gilead-sovaldiharvoni/.
214. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 36, at 37.
215. Jared S. Hopkins, Generic-Drug Approvals Soar, but Patients Still Go Without, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/many-generic-drugs-havent-hit-markethindering-cost-control-efforts-11574198448.
216. Zachary Roth, Drug-Makers Paying Off Competitors to Keep Cheap Generics off Market,
TPM Muckracker, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Dec. 2, 2009), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/
muckraker/drug-makers-paying-off-competitors-to-keep-cheap-generics-off-market.
217. Press Release, Jon Leibowitz, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, ‘Pay-for-Delay’ Settlements
(June 23, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/06/ftc-chairmanleibowitz-eliminating-pay-delay-pharmaceutical.
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fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”
But the Court has also long made it clear that the “fairness and justice” justification for compensation is negated when the government seizes property in order to stop the private owner from deploying it in a manner that harms the public welfare.
This exception to Fifth Amendment takings law is known as the
“nuisance” or “noxious use” exception. It traces its origins back to
at least 1887, when the Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas rejected
a challenge by a brewer to Kansas temperance laws that de facto destroyed the brewer’s business. The Mugler Court held that the government is within its police power to conduct a seizure to protect
public health, safety, or welfare without the requirement of compensation:
The power which the states have of prohibiting such use by
individuals of their property, as will be prejudicial to the
health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not—and,
consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot be—burdened with the condition that the state
must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary
losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community. 219
Importantly, the noxious use exception does not require a finding that the harmful acts were illegal prior to seizure. For example,
the noxious use exception was applied when value was lost in
Mugler (formerly legal liquor sales), Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead
(once-permissible gravel and sand mining zoned out by ordinance), Miller v. Schoene (diseased trees removed), and Hadacheck v.
Sebastian (brick yard zoned out by ordinance). 220 There is an argument to be made that a certain level of patent thicketing and even
pay-for-delay schemes by pharmaceutical corporations are not vio221
lations of current law. But there is no argument that these practices are not, in the words of the Mugler Court, “prejudicial to the
health, the morals, or the safety of the public,” and therefore companies engaged in these practices are not required to be compensated for the fruits of their misdeeds.

218. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
219. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
220. Id.; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S.272, (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
221. The U.S. Supreme Court in 2013 engaged in, but did not fully clarify, the pay-fordelay issue. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
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Throughout the 20th century, the nuisance/noxious use exception continued to be recognized, including in Justice Brandeis’ dissent in the landmark 1922 decision Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, and
222
six years later in Miller v. Schoene. In Miller, the Court cited Mugler
in refusing to allow compensation for the state of Virginia’s destruction of infected red cedar trees on Miller’s property, ruling
that protecting the broader public at the expense of a property
owner’s interests was a core principle of legislative police powers.
As noted above, the Mahon decision was the first to hold that a
governmental regulation can burden the use of private property
such that the regulation rises to the level of a taking that requires
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. But in 1987, the Court
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis reaffirmed that the
requirement to compensate is removed when the regulation advances a legitimate state interest, such as the interest in stopping a
threat to the common welfare. 223 “Courts have consistently held
that a State need not provide compensation when it diminishes or
destroys the value of property by stopping illegal activity or abating
a public nuisance.” 224 In 1992, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council again recognized the “long line of this Court’s cases” affirming the nuisance exception to the general rule requiring
compensation. 225 The Lucas facts involved a regulatory taking, not a
full seizure of property, but the Court’s reasoning and subsequent
lower federal court decisions point in the direction of the nuisance
exception applying to physical takings as well as regulatory
takings. 226
The nuisance exception coexists alongside multiple state and
federal statutes enabling forfeiture of private property connected
to illegal activity, as long as those forfeitures do not violate the “excessive fines” clause of the Eighth Amendment. 227 As one report
put it after the drug company GlaxoSmithKline was fined $2.8 billion for its illegal marketing, the company had become a “sophisticated criminal enterprise.” 228 Of course, the U.S. government has
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(2012).
227. See Anne Teigen & Lucia Bragg, Evolving Civil Asset Forfeiture Laws, LEGISBRIEF (Nat’l
Conf. of State Legislatures, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 2018, at 1, 1–2, http://www.ncsl.org
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SUMMER 2020]

Tell Me How It Ends

803

no obligation upon seizure of a criminal enterprise’s assets to reimburse them for the value they extracted from illegal acts. Criminal convictions are not a prerequisite for forfeiture, just a showing
that the seized property was involved in criminal activity. In fact, in
a recent ten-year period, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration took at least $3.2 billion in cash from people who were never
charged with a crime. 229 This civil forfeiture right to taking without compensation exists alongside the TRIPS Agreementprotected right to issue compulsory licensing with low or zero
remuneration when necessary to remedy anti-competitive practices. 230
In sum, the law provides both tools and justifications for the
government to seize some pharmaceutical corporation assets and
refuse to compensate on the grounds that the assets were used to
further a public nuisance or criminal activity. In this context, the
boundaries of the uncompensated seizures will be equal to a calculation of the value obtained by the corporations’ actions that
furthered a public nuisance. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to estimate that precise amount. However, given the sordid record of marketing fraud and patent abuse outlined above, the total will be substantial. It is worth again quoting constitutional
scholar and property rights advocate Roger Pilon of the Cato Institute, this time for his explanation for why the Fifth Amendment
does not require compensation for value obtained by noxious or
illegal acts. “When government acts, under its police power, to secure rights—when it stops someone from polluting, for example,
or from excessively endangering others—the restricted owner is
not entitled to compensation, whatever his financial losses, because
the uses prohibited or “taken” were wrong to begin with. . . .
[H]ere again the question is not whether value was taken but
whether a right was taken. Proper uses of the police power take no
rights. They protect rights.” 231
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D. Step Four: The USMA Seizes and Compensates Private Industry for the
Remaining Assets that Trigger the Just Compensation Requirement
As was the case with the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933
and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, if the
U.S. government executed Steps One through Three outlined in
this Article, it would inflict grievous damage on privately held corporations. That is a result that the United States has neither the
moral nor the legal obligation to regret.
As the Supreme Court held in the challenge to the TVA by the
private businesses it displaced, the harm experienced by pharmaceutical corporations is “damnum absque injuria—a damage not
232
consequent upon the violation of any right recognized by law.”
As the Court later ruled in United States v. Willow River Power Co.,
where the federal government raising of a river’s water level
harmed the efficiency of the plaintiff’s hydroelectric plant, loss of
economic value alone did not lead to a constitutional obligation to
compensate. “[The Fifth Amendment] does not undertake, however, to socialize all losses, but those only which result from a tak233
ing of property.” Similar decisions upholding the government’s
right to take actions even when they are injurious to private interests were issued by the Court in Block v. Hirsch (District of Columbia rent control is a legitimate use of state power, despite financial
loss to landlords) and Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell (widespread economic emergency justified Minnesota’s suspension of
home creditors’ foreclosure rights). 234
The TVA sequence provides the blueprint for the final stage of
the nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry. After losing
their legal challenge to the government’s action creating the TVA,
the Tennessee Electric Power Company sold its electric system to
the TVA and shut down its energy business.
Here, the U.S. pharmaceutical industry will be forced to choose
the same option. Its business model will be undercut by widespread
compulsory licensing in the United States, its most important market. Compensation will be denied for both the value of withdrawn
government support and the value gained by the industry’s nuisance behavior. The remaining value of the pharmaceutical corporations will resemble that of an oil field run dry: the land and
equipment have some residual worth, but it is a fraction of the value the land had when the oil flowed.
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In the process outlined here, the federal government will exercise its rights to shut off the flow of taxpayer-provided riches to the
pharmaceutical industry. Once it does so, compensation for the
remaining value, including manufacturing plants and distribution
infrastructure, will come at a reasonable price. That transaction
will finally conclude the tragic era of medicines profiteering and
launch a new system that restores life-saving medications to their
rightful place as affordable, accessible public goods.
CONCLUSION
Millions of Americans are in pain, at risk of emergency hospitalization, and even dying. They suffer because they cannot afford
medicines that are inexpensive to manufacture and were discovered by government-funded research. Those medicines are held in
monopolies by private, for-profit corporations that set prices at levels ensuring both record profit margins and a society-wide crisis in
accessing essential treatment.
U.S. history and law have cleared the path towards ending this
crisis. Medicines are a public good, and U.S. constitutional law justifies full seizure of all assets of the pharmaceutical industry. Moreover, the compensation for that seizure will be substantially reduced because of the industry’s reliance on government funding
and licensing and its widespread malfeasance that harms the public welfare.
Since the country’s birth, the U.S. people, acting through their
government, have shown time and again a willingness to elevate
the needs of the community over the interests of private property.
It is time to make that choice again. It is time for the United States
to nationalize its pharmaceutical industry.

